



Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel Future Scenarios

Shlomo Hasson

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How will the State of Israel look when it celebrates 75 years of existence?

How will Israel look in 2023, when it marks 75 years since its establishment? Will it be enjoying peace and tranquility in a democratic and developed Middle East? Or will it remain a fortified, isolated, and besieged country, possibly even excommunicated from most of the international community? Will it be a society divided, violent, and torn, or will there be more harmony in the relations between Arabs and Jews, religious and secular, the haves and the have-nots?

The future of this country has preoccupied many people in recent years, both within and outside Israel; those who have Israel's best interests in mind and those who wish it harm. And between these two poles are those considering another, much more calamitous option: that the country will not even reach its 75th birthday. A number of public opinion polls in Israel commissioned in the last two years demonstrate that many people, in some cases even a high percentage of respondents, are expressing fear that the State of Israel will not endure for many more years.

While such a position primarily reflects the current public mood, the more critical question is how Israel, in fact, will look in the future. Certainly this question cannot be answered with an empirically reliable prediction. How, in this dynamic, constantly changing world of ours, could it be possible to predict what will happen in the distant future? Looking back, even the most important formative events in Israel's history were not predicted ahead of time. No one estimated how significantly massive immigration from the Moslem states from the beginning of the 1950s would shape Israeli society; the Six-Day War's outcome came as a surprise and has influenced Israel more than any other historical event in the country's history up to today; the wave of a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union likewise came as a shock to virtually everyone.

What can be done is to focus on the near future. Therefore, looking forward a decade to 2023, provides a reasonable amount of time for evaluation. One can examine scenarios instead of forecasts; scrutinize a wide variety of options that are plausible, and give each one of these likelihoods differential probabilities.

This method does not by any means guarantee absolute success, as certain possibilities may evade the researcher, and any estimate of the likelihood of a

particular scenario may be erroneous. However, the scenario method has a particular advantage, since it highlights the processes currently taking place in society and analyzes the forces that influence these processes. This method can determine, for example, that if a certain factor intensifies, there is a high probability that Israeli society will move in a corresponding direction in the future; whereas if another factor intensifies, Israeli society will most likely take a different direction.

The Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies decided to create the **Israel 2023 Project** in an effort to answer the question of what is expected, or liable, to be Israel's status when it celebrates 75 years of existence –using the prospective scenarios method. The team of researchers at the Institute identified three primary issues that should be discussed by anyone trying to forecast Israel's future: the country's geopolitical situation; the relations between Jews and Arabs within Israel; and the relations between religion and state, or between the religious and secular communities in the country. There may well be several possible scenarios for each one of these issues, such that weaving each one of the scenarios into a comprehensive structure can ultimately create four or five future scenarios for Israel in 2023.

This research project was launched in 2010 and is headed by Professor Shlomo Hasson of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who specializes in the analysis of complex systems through the scenarios method. Professor Hasson has published numerous papers of this kind in the last decade for the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies in Jerusalem and in other academic, public, and governmental frameworks. The booklet presented here is the first in a series. Two similar booklets discussing the two other areas of study will be published during 2011-2012, culminating in a published volume encompassing all three booklets.

The Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies will be holding public discussions on each one of the booklets **in both Israel and the U.S.** and, ultimately, on the final book. At that point we will be able to engage not only in an academic discussion, avoiding value judgments, that analyzes the various possible directions of development, but also in a moral and ethical debate: What kind of society do we want to be in the future? How can this vision be realized? What happens if we do not succeed? The “scenarios” method of analysis allows us to put our finger more squarely today on outcomes we may not even be able to anticipate at present but that may arise if certain forces, processes, and factors that are currently in play become more prominent.

The Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies was established in 2009 at the University of Maryland at College Park, in the United States. Its founding reflects a particular trend in American academia in the last decade, that an increasing number of campuses are establishing Israel Studies departments. Courses are being added, academic chairs are being endowed, and a few universities have even established Centers for Israel Studies.

When the Gildenhorn Institute was established in College Park, very near Washington, D.C., only a few students were enrolled. By the end of that year, 400 students were taking courses on Israel, and this year that number will grow to nearly 600. Students may choose from a wide variety (over a dozen each year) courses on Israel ranging through history, politics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, society, and culture. The Institute initiates research studies on Israel and publishes some of them on its website: <http://www.israelstudies.umd.edu>. It also serves as a home for the official journal of the Association for Israel Studies, the **Israel Studies Review**: <http://www.israelstudies.umd.edu/IsraelStudiesReview.html>. In addition, it initiates academic conferences, symposia, and discussions on current affairs, participates in public debates, and takes part in the decision-making processes of the political community in the U.S. capital.

The purpose of this booklet is to foster discussion. We hope you find it informative and provocative, and invite you to send in your comments. Pleasant reading!

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INTRODUCTION

The State of Israel faces four existential challenges: the continued dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, a controversy that also underlies the conflict between Israel, the Arab States, and the Muslim world; the rift within Israel between Jews and Arabs; tension between the Jewish religion and the state; and the undermining of Israel's international legitimacy. While it is clear that the conflict between Jews and Arabs is not the only challenge facing the State of Israel, it is the most complex of all and the one posing the most serious threat. Like the external conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority [henceforth PA], it revolves around sovereignty and the right to self-determination and, like the internal tension between the Jewish religion and the state, it revolves around the image and character of the state. However, unlike the other conflicts, the solution required is far more complex.

Solution of the external conflict between Israel and the PA can be reached by a political decision to separate the sides, a solution that is not possible with regard to relations between Jews and Arabs within Israel, since the Arabs in Israel are part of the state. Resolution of the tension between the Jewish religion and the state requires inner agreement within the Jewish community, which would not undermine the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. However, such an agreement would be difficult to reach with the Arab community. Central to the tension between Jews and Arabs in Israel are issues of self-determination, sovereignty, democracy, citizenship, and interpersonal relations. These would be difficult to resolve by means of a political decision of the sort that might put an end to the external conflict or by an agreement that resolves the inner tension.

The events of October 2000 with respect to the Arab population of Israel, in the wake of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and their tragic results, revealed to Jews and Arabs alike that relations between the two populations were so delicate and fragile that a single event could have long-term influence on relations between the two groups. With respect to the events of that October, the Orr Commission wrote:

We have gained the impression from the many witnesses we have heard, that the conclusion of the events did not heal the deep scar that they left in the hearts of the country's citizens, Jews and Arabs. Even the passage of time since the events died down and ended have not brought a remedy to the wounds... The events of October made achievement of the goal of coexistence with

mutual respect more distant... At the same time, we do not believe that the events marked a point of no return in relations between the two sectors... The events of October actually demonstrated the mutual dependence between the two societies and brought home the dangers associated with polarization and confrontation. Even if full reconciliation between the parties cannot be attained in a short time, it is definitely possible.¹

The members of the Orr commission described the events of October as an earthquake, but they concluded with an expression of hope for “coexistence with mutual respect.” Looking back at the intervening time since the events, one may well doubt whether this has actually happened. Did the events of October signal a new stage in relations between Jews and Arabs, or were they perhaps merely a link in a longer historical chain? Did the brief historical interlude between 2000 and 2012 mark a turning point in Jewish-Arab relation, or was it merely a chapter in a longer history? Were the events of October a negligible occurrence in relations between Jews and Arabs, or were they perhaps a formative event that expressed the emergence of a new generation of Israeli Arabs, one that “stands tall”?²

A brief review of developments since the events of 2000 and the publication of the Report of the Orr Commission in 2003 shows that relations between Jews and Arabs have deteriorated seriously. This is expressed in proposed legislation intended to set apart and restrict Arabs, such as bills giving preference in employment to citizens who have served in the army, making the purchase of homes in small settlements on the periphery of the country dependent on a membership committee, and requiring a declaration of loyalty to the Jewish state of candidates for citizenship. It is also expressed in proclamations by rabbis against renting apartments to Arabs, and in demonstrations by Jews against Arabs. On the other side, the Arab public has increasingly expressed reservations about the Jewish character of the State of Israel, and there is a tendency toward turning inward on both sides.

Against the background of these processes, one may ask: “Where will relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel go?” Will they deteriorate into confrontation? Or, perhaps, against the background of crisis, might the opposite

¹ Report of the Orr Commission, 2002, Ch. 6, p. 15. The Orr Commission was an official body established to investigate the confrontations between security forces and Israeli citizens in October, 2000 in which 13 Arab citizens were killed.

² Rabinowitz-Abu Bakar, 2002.

tendencies emerge, so that the two sides will recover and begin reducing tensions and increasing equality and cooperation? To answer such questions, surveys presenting data on the state of relations are insufficient. While this data is undeniably important, it shows neither why relations between Jews and Arabs have declined nor what factors could lead to change.³ In order to deal with these questions, the present paper examines possible relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel by developing a number of scenarios.

What is a Scenario?

Scenarios are constructed narratives intended to provoke thought about what could happen in the future. Emphasis is on what might happen, not on predicting what will necessarily happen.⁴ The purpose of the scenarios is to tell a coherent story based on causal connections and to produce a narrative with an inner logic. In this manner, the story weaves together various events and the changes that could take place into a meaningful ensemble.⁵ In the framework of the present story regarding relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, long-term processes are revealed, as well as factors underlying these processes, and the relationships among them. In this way, possible developments of the relationships are examined, and the interested public as well as policymakers may take note of the meaning of these developments and examine the influence of various political interventions. Unlike scientific thinking, which focuses on past and present events, scenarios are directed at the future. They deal with the basic question of “What will happen if?” They focus on factors, processes, and patterns of the future.

³ An excellent source of data on the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel is the index of relations between Jews and Arabs published from time to time by Sami Smooha.

⁴ Van der Heijden, 1996; Raskin, 2008.

⁵ The relationship between a scenario and eventualities is analogous to the relation between a line and the points it joins. A scenario connects events into a meaningful whole. Thus, for example, the eventuality of an attack from the north, a prospect which the IDF must consider, has to be developed into a scenario that envisions responses to the attack, the counter-reactions, the response of the home front, the world response, the results of these developments, and their military, economic, social, political, and diplomatic influence. Thus, a scenario includes various components, among which the connections are examined in a number of “generations” – defined periods of time. It is important to examine various stories and to derive lessons from them. Naturally, the full development of a scenario cannot be limited to the military sphere. Unfortunately, those who insist on discussing “eventualities” deprive themselves, by their semantic choice of this term, of the great potential inherent in developing scenarios.

Useful scenarios combine the analysis of past processes with creative thinking about a variety of possible futures. In this framework, it is highly useful to develop a scenario of business as usual and the continuation of existing trends, using it as a point of reference for other scenarios. The development of scenarios is based on systemic thinking. For this purpose, the factors comprising the system are identified, the principal factors and motives are distinguished, points of uncertainty are located, and the influence of all the foregoing on the development of the given system is examined: in this instance, relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Generally the components of the system are identified with reference to variables in the areas of society and culture, the economy, technology, the environment, education, and politics.

Unlike predictions, scenarios emphasize the component of uncertainty and the lack of continuity. That is to say, they acknowledge that there are developments that cannot be controlled by policymakers. Thus, for example, a regional war would be likely to reshuffle the deck and move relations to a point that cannot be predicted by ordinary forecasts. Common forecasts, which assume continuity between past and future, find it difficult to cope with a dramatic change of this kind. By contrast, a scenario is capable of indicating both possible change and its meaning, and to present policymakers with challenges regarding adaptation to change. This is not to say that scenarios do not rely upon forecasts, models, and quantitative analysis. However, all of these are not scenarios but rather components that can be used in developing scenarios.⁶ The art of devising scenarios is in combining what is known with what is unknown, what is certain, which can be analyzed quantitatively, and what is uncertain, which must be considered qualitatively. The combination between the two aids in creating a possible future, but not necessarily one that will happen.

A scenario is neither a prophecy nor a vision. A scenario does not express wishes, nor is it a precise forecast of what will transpire. Scenarios are frequently threatening and difficult to accept; hence there is a natural tendency to ignore them and, when they are presented, to kill the messenger. However, it is important to remember that killing the messenger does not do away with the possibility that the story being told is liable to happen. It is also important to remember that the messenger, i.e. the one who developed the scenarios, might feel exactly the same way about them as those who resist the story, but it his or her duty to tell it. Nevertheless, one must remember that a scenario is merely the picture of one

⁶ Peterson et al., 2003:360.

possible future among many others. Such a picture can help in eliciting thought, in pointing out missing information, in examining various forms of intervention, and in evaluating their significance.

The first step in devising scenarios is to examine the socio-historical context by reviewing existing processes and patterns. A review of this kind can instruct about possible future developments, though these trends will not necessarily continue. It is important to lay bare the causal mechanisms that were active in the past, to clarify which of the variables that compose these mechanisms are characterized by uncertainty, and to indicate what the possibilities are of a transition from the existing causal mechanism to other mechanisms, in the light of the uncertainties that surround its components. Only on the basis of this review is it possible to continue to the second stage, in which the driving forces that move the system and the relations between them are identified. From there one moves on to the third stage of developing scenarios and exploring their significance.

The Socio-Historical Context

The Arabs of Israel are those who remained in the area of the State of Israel at the end of the War of Independence, before the borders were closed. After the war, this population received Israeli citizenship. Arab immigrants were added to this population, mainly as a result of family reunification, but also including those who received the right of residence in return for service to the State of Israel. The official statistics of Israel include in this group permanent residents who are not citizens, as well as those living in areas that Israel annexed after 1967: East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

From the historical and political point of view, Israel is in a unique situation, in which the internal conflict between Jews and Arabs within the state is closely connected to the external conflict between the State of Israel and the PA and Arab states. The source of the conflict is the struggle for territory, sovereignty, and symbols. The Jewish population regards the establishment of the State of Israel as the correction of a historical injustice and the fulfillment of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination according to international law. The Arab population regards itself as a native population, which was the majority, whose homeland was destroyed by the settlement of the Jewish population. The establishment of the State of Israel and its symbols is bound up in the collective memory of the Arab population with the worst catastrophe in their history – the *nakba*. This makes it difficult for them to identify with the symbols of the state.

Jewish settlement, the allocation of land, and planning are seen by the Arabs as part of the process of dispossession and as an infringement on their rights.

Most of the Arabs in Israel wish to remain in the State of Israel, to enjoy equality, and to advance the peace process. In the existing situation, the Arabs are caught between the PA and Israel, suffering from double marginalization, as Adel Mann'a argues.⁷ They are not part of the decision-making kernel of the PA, nor do they have much access to the centers of decision-making in Israel. This does not testify to dual loyalty, but rather to a dual crisis of the Arab population of Israel, a crisis that surfaces, according to Asad Ghanem in a multifarious and incomplete identity.⁸

Against the background of this dual marginality, it became clear to the Arabs in Israel that the PLO and the PA cannot represent them: their place is in Israel, and they have to redefine their situation as an Arab minority in the State of Israel. In this situation, the Arabs of Israel must deal with their own problems, including their collective memory, the matter of land, internal refugees, the demand to return to villages in limbo (like Al-Ghabassiya, and Biram), the conservation of cemeteries, and the restoration of mosques. This is a reopening of the 1948 files, done with recognition of the independent status of the Arab minority in Israel, which no longer wants an external body to represent it but which acts on its own within the Israeli political system. This approach signals both integration and friction. The Israeli Arabs are familiar with the Israeli political system and with their place as citizens within it, but they also criticize it. Both the criticism and the recognition distinguish them from Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. Against this background, relations between Jews and Arabs are subject to triple tension: national, civil, and interpersonal.

National Tension

The prolonged conflict between Israel and the Arab world has left its mark to a great extent on relations between the State of Israel and Jewish society and the Arab community in Israel. The 1950s were characterized by a suspicious and aggressive attitude toward the Arab minority that had remained in the state. The Jewish establishment regarded the Arab citizens as a danger to inner stability and a threat to national security. Consequently, it pursued a policy of control, separation, and co-optation. The state seized private and ostensibly public property (regarding which there are lawsuits on the part of the private owners

⁷ Mann'a, 1997.

⁸ Ghanem, 2003, p. 110.

to this day). The government did not permit the refugees who remained in the country to return to their homes, sometimes in violation of court orders. Until 1966 the Arab areas of habitation in Israel were under military rule, limiting the residents' movements outside of them.

The Israeli Arabs were not deprived of the right to vote during this period, and they were represented in the Knesset mainly by the Israeli Communist Party, which was a joint party of Jews and Arabs. There were also Arab satellite parties of *Mapai* (the Israeli Labor Party), which were known as the “minority parties,” though their representatives were subject to the parliamentary discipline of *Mapai*.

After the removal of the Green Line as a border in 1967, the Arabs of Israel once again discovered their national identity. This process gained momentum as a result of social and family connections with residents of the territories and contact with the Palestinian population whose national consciousness was more developed. The Arab community in Israel demonstrates deep identification with their fellow Palestinians. They tend to accept the claims of the PA and its interpretation of the existing situation, and at the same time they strive to advance civil equality in Israel, as stated by MK Abed el-Aziz el-Zoubi: “My country is in a state of war against my nation.”

Since the 1970s various groups and tendencies have emerged within the Arab community, challenging the paternalistic conduct of Israeli rule. In contrast to the generation of 1948, which was largely passive, the subsequent generations from the 1970s to the 1990s made clear demands for advancement of individual rights and, beginning in the 1990s, for collective rights. During these decades, independent Arab leadership was formed, free of the paternalism of the Zionist parties. These developments led to the adoption of independent politics and the founding of civic organizations critical of the government's policies. These political and social changes were accompanied by demands for recognition of the Arabs in Israel as a Palestinian national minority, with its own unique character and a historical connection to the territory in which it lived before Zionist settlement began. On this normative basis the demand was made for the rights of a national minority, which was based on international treaties dealing with the civil and social rights of national minorities. Demands in the area of rights were accompanied by support for the peace process and recognition of the right of the Palestinians to a national state of their own.

During the 1990s the criticism grew stronger and was guided by the nationalists connected with the Balad Movement, by the Islamic Movement, and

by the younger generation, which formed a large number of NGOs. In response to the problems and distress of the modern age, Muslims throughout the world were taking refuge in religion. This response was particularly strong in Israel, which defined itself as a Jewish state, and it ranged from moderate to severe criticism, rejecting the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. Beyond demands in the area of allocation of resources, demands were also made in the constitutional area, including change of the Law of Return and the laws of citizenship, recognition of the Arabs as a national minority, and definition of Israel as a state of all its citizens. Friction was increasing and relations between Jews and Arabs deteriorated, especially over the issue of land. The central issues were the observance of Land Day in March 1976 and the events of October 2000.

These processes have created tensions between national affiliation and civil status and within the identity of Israeli Arabs. Surveys taken during the past three decades among Israeli Arabs show strengthening of the element of Palestinian identity and weakening of support for Israel as a Jewish state. These processes intensify the feelings of the Jewish community of being threatened. Since the publication of the conclusions of the Orr Commission in 2003, the situation has evolved in a direction opposite to that of the recommendations and the hopes that were pinned on it. In the national dimension, exacerbation of relations has been registered, as reflected, among other things, in legislation to set apart and restrict the Arabs of Israel – which can undermine the democratic element.⁹ Similarly, Arab leaders who advance claims regarding collective and national rights have been prosecuted and condemned. Within the Arab public in Israel there has been a decline in recognition that Israel is the national state of the Jewish people.

These processes of exacerbation of the conflict have taken place during a period when Israeli society has undergone dramatic social and economic changes. During these years processes of democratization within Israel have intensified, including strengthening of the communications media, raising awareness of human rights, and consciousness among the Arab population in Israel of its ability to make use of political and legal mechanisms. At the same time, Israel entered the age of globalization, which was accompanied by a reduction in governmental outlays, liberalization of the economy, privatization, economic growth, and widening of the gaps between segments of the population, including those

⁹ The restrictive legislation includes bills which would make naturalization subject to a loyalty oath to the Jewish state, set up admission committees to control acceptance in small Jewish communities in the Negev and Galilee, and allow preference in employment for people who have served in the army.

between Jews and Arabs. Concurrently, demands among the Arabs in Israel for equality, the strengthening of democracy, and advancement of the peace process grew stronger.

Civil Tension

The economic gap between the Jewish and Arab societies deepened during the 1950s because of discriminatory policies toward the Arab community in the areas of land, infrastructure development, planning, and economic development. The discriminatory and exclusionist policies did not change over time, as shown by the State Comptroller's report of 2002 and that of the Orr Commission of 2003. Exclusion and discrimination are particularly conspicuous in the allocation of state lands, opposition to changes in municipal boundaries, unrecognized villages, and failure to develop physical and social infrastructure. The inequality is also evident in the low allocation of resources in the area of education, the fostering of a traditional system that is unable to cope with the challenges of the present and the future, and in refusal to recognize that the content of the school curriculum distinguishes the Arab student from the Jew. Education is the key to integration and success, and it is particularly in this area that the paternalistic patterns of the 1950s have been retained: Jewish policy makers determine the content of the curriculum for Arab students without any significant participation by Arabs. Representatives of the younger generation, who have been exposed to processes of modernization and who have acquired education and skills have found that their advancement is often blocked because of their national affiliation. Aware of their rights, they have given up on political activity and slogans of coexistence. Some of them have turned to social activism within the framework of NGOs, advocacy, the provision of services, and appeals to the judicial system to advance equality in Israel.

In the course of these developments, the Supreme Court has become a central factor in advancing equality and supporting democracy. Decisions of the High Court of Justice in lawsuits on matters connected to discrimination in allocation of land, funds, and street signs in Arabic in ethnically mixed cities have fortified the principle of equality as a constitutional right. Despite these developments, discrimination against the Arab public remains in force. Indeed, the Orr Commission Report describes the discrimination against the Arabs of Israel in detail, as well as the process that created and maintains it. The question to be asked is how is it possible to work against this discrimination, to reduce the gaps, and to create a situation in which the Arabs of Israel will be citizens with

equal rights in a state viewed by the majority of its inhabitants as the state of the Jewish people?

Since the year 2000 tension in the civil sphere has intensified. Nevertheless, there has been a reduction of inequality in education and an increase in urban planning. But on the other hand, there has been an increase of inequality in the areas of housing, health, employment, and welfare.¹⁰ No improvement has taken place in the area of land allocation. There is no recognition of collective rights in the field of education. In order to deal with some of these problems, a governmental program was approved, calling for the special investment of NIS 800 million in twelve Arab and Druze villages, concentrating on employment, solving housing problems, empowering human capital, increasing law enforcement, and strengthening personal security. To administer the program, an authority for economic development in the Arab, Druze, and Circassian sectors was established in the Prime Minister's office.¹¹

Interpersonal Tension

In the interpersonal dimension, relations between Jews and Arabs have deteriorated. The message conveyed by the Jewish community is that Arabs are not wanted here. Accordingly, large support for “transfer” has been registered. A survey by the Israeli Institute for Democracy found that 53% of the (Jewish) public believes that the state is entitled to encourage the emigration of Arabs.¹² At the same time, increasing alienation from Jewish society and the institutions of the state has been registered within the Arab community.¹³ The Democracy Index of the Israel Institute for Democracy shows that 86% of the Jewish community (76% of the entire population) believes that fateful decisions for the state must be approved by a Jewish majority. Similarly, it turns out that a large part of the Jewish community does not regard the Arabs in Israel as citizens with equal rights. Only 51% of the Jewish public is in favor of full equality of rights between Jews and Arabs. It appears that the main reason for this opposition derives from the prolonged geopolitical dispute. Almost two thirds (62%) of the Jews believe that as long as Israel is in conflict with the Palestinians, the opinions of Arab citizens of Israel on matters of foreign policy and security should not be taken into account. Interpersonal tension with national overtones is also visible

¹⁰ The Sikkuy Equality Index, 2009.

¹¹ Government Decision no. 1539, March 21, 2010.

¹² Arian et al., 2010.

¹³ Smooha, 2010.

in the civil domain. Most of the respondents from the Jewish community (55%) believe that more resources should be allocated to Jewish settlements than to Arab settlements. Just a minority (42%) disagrees with this idea.

The Question of the Balance between National Identity and Citizenship

Two basic issues characterize the essence of the State of Israel: its establishment as a Jewish state (or as the state of the Jewish people) and its declaration of loyalty to the principles of democracy, human rights, and equality. This results in tension between the *national approach*, which emphasizes awareness and distinction regarding national affiliation, and the *civil approach*, which emphasizes blindness toward the national affiliation with respect to the allocation of resources and political rights. Empirically, this tension is expressed in the great gap between the egalitarian ideal of democracy and the making of distinctions against the background of nationality. The *ideal* is equality, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, in the basic (constitutional) laws of the state – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – and in the rulings of the Supreme Court.

Reality is mixed. On the one hand, there are elements of equality, while on the other hand there is exclusion, inequality, and prolonged discrimination. On the one hand, the Arabs, Druze, and Circassians in Israel exercise their civil rights. They are entitled to vote and be elected to the representative bodies of the state, both on the governmental level of the Knesset and on the level of local councils and municipalities. They are free to organize and establish political parties to represent them in the Knesset. However, on the other hand, the Arab citizens' right to equality is not fulfilled in many areas, and there is inequality between Jews and the minorities. This inequality is expressed in discrimination in the allocation of resources for education, for local government, in unemployment and getting jobs, and especially in the civil service.

The balance between these two components, nationalism and national rights on the one hand, and democracy and civil rights, on the other, and the search for ways to decrease the tension between them, is one of the central challenges facing many states in the world today, where there are national minorities in general and indigenous populations in particular. Many Israeli scholars in the field of political sociology and political science, both Arabs and Jews, have related to this issue and its consequences for the civil status of the Arabs in Israel. In their opinion, this status is influenced by three factors: the State of Israel as a Jewish state; the State of Israel as a democratic state; and the State of Israel as a state with special

security needs.¹⁴ These scholars do not agree about the status of the Arabs in the State of Israel. Peled cites the words of the former Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Menachem Elon:

The principle that the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people is the foundation and purpose of the State of Israel; the principle of equal rights and obligations for all the citizens of the State of Israel is essential to the character of the State of Israel. The latter principle is not an addition to the former one, nor is it meant to change it; the principle of equal rights and obligations of citizens cannot change the principle that the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and of the Jewish people alone.¹⁵

In the opinion of Lifshitz, the Arabs in Israel are not partners, nor do they belong to the national consensus on essential matters touching the existence and actions of the State of Israel.¹⁶ This tension between national identity and civil identity undoubtedly causes contradictions and conflicts in values and tension within the Arab society of Israel. One of the conspicuous contradictions relates to the social and national identity of the Israeli Arabs. Many studies point to the existence of two identities: national (Palestinian) identity, which is different from their (Israeli) civil identity.¹⁷ These two opposing identities certainly do not contribute to the definition of identity; rather, they create a situation of disunity among identities that dwell together. Other researchers add different components to identity, such as the Arab component and the religious component, which exacerbate the problem.¹⁸

Clarification of the relations between nationalism and democracy and between national and civil affiliation cannot take place in a historical, political, and social vacuum. The meaning of nationalism and democracy and the relations between these systems of values are influenced by historical, social, and political processes. The question is what has happened over time to the relations between nationalism and democracy. What changes have taken place in the relations between the view of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and the perception of it as a democratic state? How have these changes affected the system of identities, the allocation of resources, and the cultural orientation? What are the relations between the two

¹⁴ Bishara, 1993, 1996; Peled, 1993; Smooha, 1996; Gavison, 1998.

¹⁵ Cited in Peled 1993, p. 30.

¹⁶ Lifshitz, 1994.

¹⁷ Smooha, 1980; Heidar, 1994; Ben-Dov, 1995.

¹⁸ Benziman and Mansour, 1992.

conceptions today, and what directions of change can be expected in the future? Has one conception gained strength at the expense of the other? If so – why has this happened? The balance between the values of nationalism and democracy, Israel as a Jewish state and Israel as a democratic state, has always been dynamic, as Justice Aharon Barak wrote:

The interpreter's aspiration is compatibility and harmony between the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and her values as a democratic state... Some authorities believe that the constitutional text requires preference to the State of Israel as a Jewish state.. while others believe that the text demands preference for the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state. Neither of these approaches appear acceptable to me... In the matter of judicial discretion... the judge must offer the solution that is consistent with the consensus of Israeli society; he must give a solution connected with the past that provides a basis for development in the future.¹⁹

The conclusion that derives from this is that there can be no single, universal decision. The balance between nationalism and citizenship will change over time in accordance with constitutional history, with the socio-political situation, with past developments and future expectations. Hence, in discussing the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority one must be aware of the historical, social, and political context. A dynamic conception is also justified by international experience. For example, a survey of developments in Europe, the cradle of modern nationalism, shows essential differences between the veteran nation-states in Western Europe, where nationalism is civic in nature, and the relatively new nation-states in Eastern Europe, where nationalism is of an ethnic nature.

¹⁹ Barak, 2002, p. 28.

THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS IN ISRAEL

What are the factors that shape relations between Jews and Arabs in the three dimensions I have surveyed: the national, the civil, and the interpersonal? Constructing scenarios is of great importance in answering this question, since by using them one can identify the forces that have affected these relations in the past and the present and bring to light the mechanism that shapes them. The theory that deals with internal conflicts against an ethno-national background includes four groups of factors that underlie them.²⁰

1. Structural factors: weak states, problems of domestic security, the ethnic geography of the state;
2. Political factors: discriminatory political institutions, exclusivist national ideology, the political relations among the groups, the politics of the elites;
3. Economic and social factors: economic problems, a discriminatory economic system, processes of modernization;
4. Cultural and conceptual factors: models of cultural discrimination, a history of problematic relations among the groups.

Structural Factors

The Prolonged Arab-Israeli Conflict

Relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in the state are influenced by the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Arab world, especially by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has deepened since 2000. The connection between the Arab minority in Israel and the larger Arab world in general and in particular with the Palestinian population, to which it belongs, places it within the category of a hostile minority, which must be kept under surveillance.²¹ Smooha writes: "The Arab minority in Israel is part of the Arab majority in the region, which is regarded by the Jews as a threat to their security, culture, and demography."²² This perception was sharpened further after abolition of the military government in 1966 and after the renewed encounter with the Palestinian people on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the 1967 war. Following this encounter, Palestinian

²⁰ See the instructive theoretical survey in Brown, 1996.

²¹ Lustik, 1985.

²² Smooha, 1996, p. 296.

national consciousness was sharpened among the Arab community in Israel, and there was an increase in solidarity with the neighboring Palestinian people. Since the establishment of the state, the Arabs in Israel have been trying to find a path of survival between their being Palestinian Arabs with respect to their national affiliation and their being citizens of the State of Israel. According to Zeidani:

The state refuses to consider the Arabs in Israel as an ethnic-national minority with rights as a collectivity. It divides this collectivity into various segments and groups... On the other hand, the state refuses to relate to the Arabs as autonomous individuals, each of whom has his own inner value, and each of whom is a world unto itself according to his or her talents, needs, and personal potential... In short, you are rejected as an Arab, people are indifferent to you as an individual, and they demand categorical, absolute loyalty to the state.²³

Demographic Growth

The Arab population on the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel was about 156,000, about 19% of the population of the state in 1949. It then fell to 14% after the mass Jewish immigration of the 1950s. The Arab population changed from being the majority, developing social and cultural life and enjoying a system of self-rule, to a minority, different in religion, language, sentiments, and aspirations from the Jewish majority. In 2010 the Arab population of Israel was about 1.5 million, about 20% of the total population of the state. The Arab population includes three religions: 82% are Muslim, 10% are Christian, and 8% are Druze (sometimes the Druze are regarded as a minority separate from the rest of the Arab population). Although the percentage of Arabs in Israel changed little between 1949 and 2010, the numerical increase is important: a population of more than a million is a community whose presence and demands cannot be ignored. Moreover, the Arab population is characterized by its youth – the median age is twenty – and the fertility rate of Arab women, although it has declined, is higher than that of Jewish women. In 2008 the average fertility rate of Arab women was 3.6 children, and of Jewish women, 2.9 children.²⁴ As a result, the relative size of the Arab population is expected to increase from 20% in 2008 to 25% in 2025.²⁵

The fact that the majority of the Arabs living in Israel are law abiding citizens, refraining from activity against the state, and frequently signaling that they wish

²³ Zeidani, 1998, p. 113.

²⁴ Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009.

²⁵ This calculation was made by taking the middle estimation as the realistic one. See the Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004.

to be citizens with equal rights, has fallen on deaf ears. The national and cultural difference (language, religion, and customs), closeness to the Palestinian people, and identification with their demand for self-determination and the establishment of their own homeland have often been used by politicians and academics to heighten the tension between Jews and Arabs in Israel. From the Jewish point of view, the most common threat is the demographic danger inherent in the continued growth of the Arab population. The events of October 2000 increased the resentment between the two sides and created an easy platform for those continuing to harp on the danger supposedly inherent in the demographic growth of the Arabs in Israel.

Geographical Concentration

Most of the Arab population of Israel (about 90%) lives in three main concentrations: the Galilee, the Negev, and what is known as the Triangle. Other groups of the Arab population live with Jews in the mixed cities, but mainly in separate neighborhoods. More than a hundred thousand Arabs, about ten percent of the Arab population of Israel, now live in mixed cities.

Until recently there was little migration of Arab citizens among the various areas or within them. In the 1980s, however, the first waves of migration of Arabs to the mixed cities were registered, especially to Jerusalem, Haifa, and Upper Nazareth. It should be noted that urbanization, which is usually characterized by migration from the countryside to cities, is a common phenomenon in modern society. It is difficult to point to the existence of this phenomenon among the Arab population of Israel, compared to Arab states. What characterizes the Arab settlement in Israel is a process of internal urbanization, expressed in the transformation of smaller Arab settlements into urban centers. The urbanization of Arab villages in Israel includes changes in several areas: demography, the labor force, and an increase in built-up areas. In this process, village life remains intact, even after a village has grown in terms of built-up area and the size of its population. Villages that have become small cities are today regarded officially as municipalities, although life within them is similar in many respects to village life.

Political Factors

Discriminatory Institutions and Policies

Continuation of the conflict and heightening resentment and animosity provide a comfortable excuse for policies hostile to the Arabs in allocation of land, planning,

housing, and the development of physical and social infrastructure. Moreover, the decisions made regarding allocation of funds to the Arab community have never been implemented. They have been blocked at the level of the central administration or that of officials in the field. This policy is anchored in the wish to retain institutional structures that give an advantage to the Jewish public. In addition, the legislative and legal systems act to maintain this policy, since at bottom they are based on a view that gives superior status to the Jewish public in its connection to the land and in determining the nature of the state.

One of the results of this is discrimination on the level of rights. Jews, by virtue of belonging to the dominant nation, retain collective rights (in areas such as land allocation and the establishment of settlements) and individual rights, whereas the Arabs retain individual and collective rights only in the area of language, religion, and culture. In that respect the State of Israel is a republican democracy in which the general good is defined by the Jewish group.²⁶

Political Relations between the Groups

These relations range between paternalism and conflict and animosity. In the 1950s and 1960s, a large proportion of the Arab community voted for Zionist parties. After 1967 the Communist Party grew, espousing the values of peace and equality. Beginning in the late 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, national and Islamic trends developed within the Arab community. These trends were nourished by the acquisition of education and by the rise of a new intellectual elite, which replaced those who had fled or been expelled during the 1948 war. This elite contained various tendencies: the veteran Communist stream, the Islamic stream, which was connected to the Northern and Southern Islamic Movements, and the new nationalist stream, which found expression in the Sons of the Village movement and later in the Balad party. The Northern Islamic Movement boycotted the elections, while the southern branch, more moderate, endorsed them. The leaders of Balad called for national autonomy, the creation of a state of all its citizens and, by extension, a state of all its nations.²⁷

Since the establishment of the state, no Arab party has been part of a government coalition. In recent years, political relations between the groups have become more acrimonious and recently a number of bills have been proposed that would rescind citizenship, including the citizenship of Arab members of the Knesset, because of participation in protest actions against the government's

²⁶ Peled, 1993.

²⁷ Bishara, 1993.

policy. Parallel to the conflict between political parties and a certain decline in the power of the parties, the strength of Arab civic organizations has increased. These NGOs are active in various areas: provision of services, communication, empowerment, and advocacy. These organizations have placed the issue of inequality on the public agenda in several areas, they have appealed to the courts, and they have formed connections with human rights organizations and international bodies throughout the world with the aim of improving the status of the Arab community of Israel.

Economic and Social Factors

The economic and social gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel are the result of the historical inheritance that located the Arab population on the geographical periphery – which limits its access to labor markets and services, and economic policy. The historical inheritance and social and cultural norms influence participation in the work force. The proportion of Arab women in the labor market, as of 2008, was 22%, which was significantly lower than that of Jewish women (66.6%). Among men, the proportion of those employed was almost equal: 67% among Arabs as opposed to 68.8% among Jewish men. In 2007 the average gross salary among Arab men was NIS 5410 versus NIS 7885 among Jewish salaried workers.²⁸ The standard of living, as expressed by monthly family income was also lower: NIS 8151 gross income for an Arab household, versus NIS 14,157 for a Jewish household. The continued growth of the Arab population, without any change in women's employment, will mean relatively low Arab participation in the labor force, maintaining the gap between the Jewish and Arab populations.²⁹

There is discrimination against the Arab community with respect to the allocation of resources for economic development and infrastructure in the local councils. The situation is also worrisome in the area of employment. Young Arabs who have acquired an education find it difficult to be hired both in public institutions and in companies privately owned by Jews. As a result, the gaps have widened in most areas, except for education, and frustration has grown, especially among young people.

²⁸ Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Employment, the General Council for Economic Research, 2010, p. 70.

²⁹ Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010.

Processes of Urbanization, Modernization, and Acquisition of Education

The urbanization in Arab settlements, which was accompanied by modernization and the acquisition of education, brought substantial changes in the attitude of the Arab community to the authorities, especially among young people. The Arab community is aware of its rights today and prepared to struggle for them with determination. These processes were accelerated after the creation of a stratum of intellectuals, who demand the closing of the gaps, progress in individual rights, national recognition, and advancement of the collective rights of the national minority. The younger generation is far more critical than the previous one and demands egalitarian treatment, while emphasizing national affiliation as well as equality on a group basis in areas of language, culture, and religion.

Blocking channels for the professional advancement of the younger generation has led to the diversion of energy to areas of political and social action and the establishment of a broad variety of civic organizations and countrywide institutions that advocate equalizing conditions between Jews and Arabs and recognition of the Arabs as a national group that possesses rights. These processes of criticism of the existing system and the increasing demand for equality are supported by liberal circles in the Jewish public. Despite urbanization, modernization, and education, the educational level of the Arab population is significantly lower than that of the Jews. In 2008 the percentage of high school seniors receiving a matriculation certificate was 44% among Arabs as opposed to 54% among Jews.

Cultural-Conceptual Factors

Growing Extremism in Public Opinion

Public opinion within both the Jewish and Arab communities has been radicalized in recent years following the persistence of the Israel-Palestine dispute and the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Each of the two groups tends to withdraw into itself and to interpret the behavior of the others in a threatening manner. This extremism is often nurtured by the media and by intellectual and religious thinkers who contribute to the extremism and to sully the image of the other.

Globalization in the Cultural Area

As against the extremism overtaking Israel, one can distinguish opposing processes that are taking place in the world today. Throughout the world there is increased awareness of the rights of minorities, and international treaties are regulating this. The connection between Arab organizations in Israel and human

rights organizations active elsewhere provides a moral basis and political and economic power for the activities of these organizations. In the Jewish community, human rights organizations and social organizations for the advancement of civil cooperation between Jews and Arabs are also active. The organizations are supported by international organizations that act to advance human rights. The process of globalization receives clear expression in the area of communications as well. Reception of satellite broadcasts from neighboring countries has strengthened the bond of the Israeli Arab citizens with Arabic culture, and has reduced the power and influence of the Israeli media.

Barriers

This review of the factors that influence relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel shows that substantial barriers underlie these relations. Surprisingly, scholarship has constantly tended to ignore these barriers while devoting most of its attention to the manifest result of the action of the barriers: inequality. Thus, attention has been devoted to the symptoms rather than to the deep causes that underlie the gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The examination of barriers was originally developed in the field of psychology (in the cognitive, emotional, and instrumental areas, including values and moral conceptions) by a group of researchers at the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. In the course of time, research was devoted to the structural-political area and to strategy. As yet, however, no comprehensive theory has been developed in this area.³⁰

Based on analysis of the factors that influence relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, it is possible to identify three main groups of barriers that make it difficult to change the existing situation: barriers in the national dimension, in the civil dimension, and in the interpersonal dimension. In the national dimension, it is possible to locate barriers whose source is in the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Arab world and the PA, as well as barriers connected to ideologies and basic values. In the civic dimension, one can locate political and administrative barriers whose source is the desire to retain institutional structures that give an advantage to the Jewish public, legal and judicial barriers that give the Jewish community superior status in its attachment to the land and in determining the character of the state, and economic barriers whose source is in the historical heritage and in the location in the spatial and social network. In the interpersonal

³⁰ Arrow et al, 1995.

dimension one can identify psychological and socio-cultural barriers on both sides, making contact and rapprochement difficult.

Any change in the system of barriers is likely to move relations between Jews and Arabs from one situation to another. Thus, for example, an end to the geopolitical conflict and a change in policy could alter the direction of the development of relations and move it from a situation of sliding into conflict to a situation of moderation of the conflict. Table 1 presents the three principal scenarios, according to the three principal dimensions: national, civil, and interpersonal.

Table 1: The scenarios, according to the three principal dimensions

Dimension	Scenarios		
	Moderation Reconciliation	In Between Liminality	Extremism Confrontation
National	Recognition of the Jewish people's right to a State Recognition of the Arabs in Israel as a national minority with rights or as a national partner	De facto acceptance of the national demands Hybrid identity	Religious and national extremism Essential identity
Civil	Civil equality	Discussion with few but tangible results	Continued inequality Despair of coexistence
Interpersonal	Two-way processes of similarity and integration, shared spaces in housing, employment, services, and leisure	Between worlds: one foot here and one foot there in culture, society, economy, housing	Turning inward

The continued existence of the barriers on the national level will lead to paralysis of the situation, resulting in either a hybrid identity or *de facto* recognition of the national claims of both sides. This is an ambivalent situation, unclear, and full of contradictions, which is defined as a *liminal* situation. Rejection of the national claims of both sides is liable to cause deterioration of the situation into *confrontation*. However, recognition of national rights, which could have various expressions – autonomy, power sharing, bi-nationalism, consociational democracy – could lead to a situation of *reconciliation*. In the civil area, strengthening the barriers could bring about increased inequality. Conversely, moderation of the barriers could bring about equality. In the interpersonal area, continuation of the present situation means divided identities and behavior, with one foot here, one there. Deterioration into confrontation will accelerate processes of withdrawal, whereas moderation of resentment and alienation could lead to integration and resemblance.

What determines the direction of action and the strength of the barriers is their interpretation and how the human agents treat them. In other words, the barriers are constraints that place limits with which the human agents cope according to their ability, qualifications, and values. In this way a force field is created in which structural barriers and human agents act, shaping the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Based on the literature that deals with intra-state conflicts, these factors have been grouped into a number of driving forces – see Table 2. The driving forces presented in Table 2 reflect the action of the forces on the local level (leaders, public opinion, economy and society, ideology and culture, demography), on the regional level (the geopolitical conflict), and on the world level (world public opinion and the super-powers).

The three principal scenarios represent the uncertainty that surrounds the relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs. Moderation of geopolitical tensions, change in public opinion, improvements in the economic area, and pressure from international public opinion can improve relations, or the opposite. An intermediary situation between the extremes is also possible, and this is represented by the liminal scenario. This is a situation laden with ambivalence and lack of clarity, in which it is possible to move without resort to clear and sharp definitions. At bottom, the scenarios present various movements according to the dimensions of nationalism, citizenship, and interpersonal relations, as represented in Table 1.

Table 2: The field of possible scenarios, according to driving forces

Driving Forces	Scenarios		
	Reconciliation	Liminality	Confrontation
The Geopolitical Conflict	Ends	Drags along	Exacerbates
Leadership	Moderate and practical	Ambivalent	Extremist
Public Opinion among Jews and Arabs	Moderate	Divided	Extremist
Economy and Society	Significant narrowing of gaps	No significant change in gaps	Widening gaps
Ideology and Culture	Hybrid	Partial adaptation	Separation
Demographic Balance	Jewish majority without significant change	Jewish majority in decline until 2030	Jewish majority in decline until 2030
International Public Opinion	Supports a national State with minority rights	Ignores minority rights	Partially supports minority rights

Two of the scenarios, confrontation and reconciliation, represent two opposite poles: reconciliation and rapprochement on the national, civic, and interpersonal levels versus extremism and increasing struggle in those areas. The liminal scenario presents an intermediary situation that can develop in three different directions: maintenance of the existing situation, extremism, or reconciliation. Maintenance of the situation implies adaptation to the existing situation. Extremism refers to a confrontation that challenges the basic principles of the system and leads to a substantial change in the existing situation. Transition to reconciliation would mean a civil struggle and negotiations that would not challenge the basic principles of the existing system; its purpose would be improvement of the civil status of the Arabs in Israel.³¹

³¹ For an analysis of the difference between a strategy of radical confrontation and a strategy of a cooperative struggle, see Jamal, 2007.

Which Way are Relations between Jews and Arabs Moving?

The scenarios presented in Tables 1 and 2 deal with two questions: What will be the character of relations between Jews and Arabs and what will be the future character of the state with respect to the balance between nationalism and citizenship? That is to say, will Israel remain a state that gives expression to the Jewish people's aspiration for self-determination by creating a democratic Jewish state that respects human and minority rights, or will that aspiration prove to be hopeless?

Table 2 describes a number of driving forces that shape the answers to these questions. One key force is the ethno-national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The question is: How will this conflict influence relations between Arabs and Jews in the State of Israel? Current trends show that in the existing state of conflict the Arabs find themselves torn between their nation and their state. Most of them are law abiding, but with respect to their attitudes and conceptions, there is a high degree of identification with the Palestinian side. What will happen if the conflict is intensified? Where will the Israeli Arabs stand? Another question is: what will happen to relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel if the conflict ends, and the two sides reach an agreement? Will this necessarily improve relations between the Jews and Arabs in Israel? Or, perhaps the end of the external conflict might intensify the internal conflict against the background of the claims of the Israeli Arabs to change the character and nature of the state.

A central force in shaping the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel is the economic and social inequality between the two groups. One interesting question is how the economic situation will influence relations between them. Will the existing economic and social gap narrow, remain the same, or widen? Assuming that the economic and social gap will narrow, will this lead to moderation of nationalist tensions? Studies of social movements, as well as protest and confrontational movements, show that tensions increase particularly in periods when the population that has been left behind experiences social mobility. Awareness of the gap between the minority and the majority increases, and what informs behavior is not absolute mobility but rather the relative gap between the groups. Under these conditions, resentment is liable to increase and hasten processes of struggle and confrontation.

For a long time the demographic variable has been considered as critical while thinking about relations between Jews and Arabs in the future. Demographic trends have diminished the importance of this variable and reduced the uncertainty

surrounding it. The fertility rate of Arab women has declined significantly and reached the level of 3.6 children per woman in 2008. However, the fertility rate of Jewish women reached the level of 2.9 children per woman in that year. In this respect, the vector of fertility among Arab women is consistent with those that exist all over the world: fertility declines as education rises. In contrast, the increased fertility among Jewish women, despite the rise in their education, deviates from the general model in the world. This is especially conspicuous among Jewish women of Russian extraction, who moved from the model of one child per family to one very close to other Israeli-Jewish women. The special security situation in Israel might be responsible for this development. The fertility gap between Jews and Arabs has largely been covered by Jewish immigration to Israel from abroad.

The middle demographic estimate of the Central Bureau of Statistics for 2025, which is taken to be realistic, points to a slight change in the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs. The proportion of the Jewish and “other”(non-Arab) population (mainly non-Jewish immigrants from the former USSR, most of whom behave like Israeli-Jews) is likely to decline, according to the forecast of the Central Bureau of Statistics, from 81% in 2000 to 75% in 2025. The proportion of the “other” population, also according to the forecast of the Central Bureau of Statistics, will be around 5%, so the Jews will constitute around 70% of the population. Thus, the percentage of Arabs in the population will rise from 20% to 25%.³² A new forecast prepared by Uzi Ravhon and Gilad Malach predicts that the proportion on the Jewish population in 2030 will be higher than that predicted by the Central Bureau of Statistics and will reach 73%.³³

Some will claim that the significant demographic change will take place after 2030. However, the data regarding demographic processes in the Middle East do not support that claim. In all the states in the Middle East there has been a systematic decline in fertility. At the same time, the prospect that within twenty-five years the Arab population of Israel will grow to about a quarter of the whole population – some 2.5 million out of the total of 10 million people who are expected to be living in Israel in 2030 – ought to raise questions regarding the character of relations between the two groups in the future. What will happen if the confrontation between Jews and Arabs grows in intensity and the two groups depend on their numerical strength to change the character of the state? Although the Arabs are not expected to become a majority in the state, the size

³² Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004.

³³ Ravhon and Malach, 2008, pp. 34-36.

and geographical concentration of Arab population in a few areas in the Galilee and the Triangle, where they are the majority, could increase their power and influence on events in the state. What will happen if they demand autonomy in the regions where they are the majority or even a change in the nature of the state, turning it into a bi-national state? Will the Jewish community agree to this or act to prevent it? How will the nations of the world relate to these demands? Will they reject them or adopt them, as they did in Kosovo?

Other questions arise in the wake of globalization. How will the economic processes connected with the weakening of borders influence nation-states in general and Israel in particular? Will this trend make the nation-state into a temporary episode between the imperial system that prevailed in large parts of the world and a future global order with a cosmopolitan orientation, as a number of scholars and statesmen predict?³⁴

These questions mainly relate to large structures: the geopolitical conflict, the socio-economic gap, demography, and worldwide changes. They are subject to uncertainty and will influence relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Alongside these structural factors, further questions arise regarding human factors. What will be the position of the leadership and public opinion in Jewish and Arab society toward the state and its nature? Will the struggle between (Jewish) nationalism, which supports a (Jewish) national state, and (Arab-Palestinian) nationalism, that challenges the (Jewish) national state grow sharper? Will a way be found to foster a field where the elites and moderate groups can join forces in a civil society to deepen democracy? What will be the image of the State of Israel under those conditions? Or, perhaps, is there no chance for cooperation among moderates in the future, and extremist forces on both sides will influence the fabric of relations? Here, too, we find a high degree of uncertainty because of the difficulty in predicting the power of the various groups and their ability to mobilize resources and to influence the balance of relations between nationalism and citizenship.

The question is not whether there will be a change in the relations between nationalism and citizenship in Israel. History shows that every state that has grappled with similar issues, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, has undergone significant changes over time. The crucial question is: what will be the course of change, and how will it be achieved? Will it be accomplished through negotiations among moderates within the two groups, or will it be the result of a confrontation between extremist nationalists? Will internal rifts develop within

³⁴ Held, 2005.

the two groups and, if so, how are they likely to influence inter-group relations and the image of the state? Will the authorities meet the changes taking place with a concerted or divided opinion? And how will changes in the external geopolitical conflict and internal developments on the economic and civic level influence these courses of events?

Research on Israeli society, including studies dealing with possible scenarios, has paid scant attention to a theoretical treatment of the possible changes.³⁵ Instead of a theoretical treatment, which relates to structural factors and human agents and the various possibilities within a given scenario, the prevalent tendency has been to present a normative theoretical framework regarding a worthy image for the state. Thus, for example, the scenario of a bi-national state in the entire area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, or within the State of Israel itself, has been presented without taking into consideration the uncertainty surrounding the various forces that are likely to lead in that direction and without clarifying how these factors would be likely to lead to other developments.

The development of scenarios requires simultaneous attention to processes and patterns. In this framework one must clarify the following questions: Who will be the political and social agents that take part in shaping the course of events? How will these forces be influenced by structural, geopolitical, and economic changes? How will these forces act? What will be their influence on the image of the state and its character?

To deal with these questions, I have developed a number of scenarios that relate to the dimensions of nationalism, citizenship, and interpersonal relations. Maximalist Jewish nationalism in support of a nation-state means seeking to make the State of Israel a nation-state, where full citizenship is granted only to members of the nation. Maximalist Arab nationalism that challenges the Jewish nation-state means dismantling the state and replacing it by another model: a bi-national state. What characterizes both positions of maximalist nationalism is unwillingness to accept the rules of belonging to a joint political community. Between these two positions lie various intermediary models, all of which imply willingness to live in the framework of a common political framework.

The component of citizenship can also range from a situation of equality and inclusion to one of inequality and exclusion. Finally, the component of interpersonal relations can range from a situation of acceptance and inclusion to one of rejection and isolation. The scenarios differ from each other in the manner of the connection and balance among nationalism, democracy, and interpersonal

³⁵ Ossetzky-Lazar, Ghanem, Pappé, 1999.

relations. Theoretical treatment of the three dimensions – nationalism, citizenship, and interpersonal relations – is expressed in three different scenarios: confrontation, liminality, and reconciliation.

The scenario of confrontation may be expressed in cyclical crises that increase in gravity. These crises are expressed in tensions, persecution, restriction, and diminution of democracy, which ultimately lead to an ethnocratic regime in Israel. According to this scenario, the regime in the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River will degenerate into a bi-national state in a number of stages: the creation of a bi-national space, a bi-national state imposed by force, and repeated violent outbreaks demonstrating the impossibility of installing a bi-national state by agreement. This decline into a bi-national state is liable to provoke a counter-reaction, which will seek to establish a homogeneous Jewish nation-state, even if this entails civil conflict between Jews and Arabs within Israel.

The liminal scenario is characterized by vague situations, in which nationalism, citizenship, and interpersonal relations are in an ambivalent, in-between state. In this scenario, the definitions are fuzzy, the language is ambiguous, political behavior ranges from the rhetoric of equality to the practice of confrontation, slight progress is made in civic matters, and various groups within the Jewish and Arab populations develop different patterns of relations that range from isolation and distancing to cooperation and integration. The lack of clarity is great. The possible regimes are: ethnic democracy and improved ethnic democracy.

The scenario of reconciliation is based on a substantial change in values, conceptions, and in the political relations between the groups. It is expressed through cooperation on the national level, equality on the civic level, and processes of integration and resemblance on the interpersonal level. Within it are a variety of secondary scenarios that are supported by various groups. According to the majority within the Jewish camp, this scenario leads to a democratic nation-state that acknowledges the national rights of the Arab community. In this situation, the Jewish people would be fulfilling its right to self-determination in the state, and this right would be recognized by the Arab community. The Jewish majority in the state would be maintained, but the Arab minority would have the rights of a national minority, including collective rights in the spheres of religion, culture, education, and language. According to the Palestinian Arab camp, reconciliation would have to be based on political symmetry, expressed in a bi-national state. According to the post-Zionist camp, reconciliation would be based on a liberal democratic state – a state of all its citizens – where constitutional patriotism would replace national patriotism.

Each of these scenarios – confrontation, liminality, and reconciliation – is presented, taking into account the processes and patterns to which they give rise. The processes describe the generating mechanism underlying the scenario. The patterns are the political, economic, and social consequences. The interesting point is to identify the processes, the factors underlying them, the relations between them, and the consequences to which they lead. In each of the scenarios, attention is paid to the driving forces presented in Table 2 and the possible outcomes from the national, civic, and interpersonal points of view presented in Table 1. Each scenario is presented as a story that weaves together the events and occurrences of the past and future trends into a coherent and meaningful story. The differences among the scenarios are produced by the uncertainty that surrounds the driving forces. Thus, for example, in the scenario of confrontation, geopolitical history does not change, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains as it was or even intensified. A change in this factor could move the system onto a different scenario.

THE CONFRONTATION SCENARIO

Underlying the confrontation scenario is the historical collision of two national movements: Jewish and the Palestinian – struggling over the same piece of land. This collision began more than a century ago in the wake of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel. The Palestinians within Israel and abroad regard this settlement as colonial dispossession, whereas most of the Jews see it as the return of their nation to their homeland. Herein lies the special nature of the confrontation. In contrast to the conflict between Israel and her other neighbors, which mainly concerns borders, this conflict is deeper, and the same territory, the same places, the same symbols, and the same claims are central to it. It is a conflict between justice and justice, history versus history, and one nation versus another. Although the scenario deals with the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel, it is difficult to distinguish between the Arabs in Israel and those who live elsewhere, since they belong to the same people. Hence in developing the scenario, one must bear in mind that developments within Israel are often tied to events in the PA and in the areas on the West Bank controlled by Israel.

The Mechanism of the Confrontation Scenario

The scenario is driven by a complex mechanism that combines geopolitical developments, ideological, psychological, and cultural concepts, and political and social processes. All of these together shape the system of relations between Jews and Arabs and the character of the state. The factors and processes that characterize this scenario were present in the past and persist in the present, and the scenario examines the connections between these processes and looks toward possible future developments.

The Geopolitical and Social History

From the 1920s until the early twenty-first century, no change took place in the relations between Jews and Palestinian Arabs; their relations have been an unbroken series of struggles. These began in the events of 1920, 1929, 1936-39, continued in the wars of 1948 and 1967, the events of Land Day in 1976, and the riots of 2000. Geopolitically speaking, the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians beyond her borders and the struggle between Jews and Arabs within Israel are essentially the same struggle. The Palestinian Arabs refused in the past and refuse today to acknowledge the right of the Jewish people to

establish a nation-state in the land of their ancestors and to fulfill their right to self-determination there, as it has been recognized by the family of nations.

In contrast to the relations with other Arab countries, the conflict with the Palestinians concerns neither borders nor strategic places. Rather it is about the same piece of land, to which both sides attribute historical and cultural value and importance, far beyond its strategic value. In this respect there is no difference between the Palestinians in the PA and those who are citizens of Israel – they are the same national group, with the same memories, aspirations, values, and interests. Therefore, history is bound to repeat itself, and one may predict with a great deal of certainty that the geopolitical confrontation will break out again in the future.

It is quite likely that the next confrontation will break out over the demolition of houses in Bedouin settlements in the Negev or because of growing friction in the mixed cities of Israel, as in Akko in 2008. Failure of the Oslo process and fading hope for a two-state solution increase geopolitical tension and enhance the radicalization of the two groups. The distinction between Palestinians outside of Israel and those within the country, which was defined in the past as the inner frontier,³⁶ is increasingly fuzzy in the view of many Jews, and twilight zones have been created on both sides of the Green Line, which was once the international border. The presence of Israelis in the territories and the creation of a Palestinian entity, which is less than a state and more than local autonomy, has led some Jewish and Arab individuals to assume that the era of the nation-state is over, and that it will be replaced by a bi-national entity. The majority of Israeli Jews, however, is not of that opinion and, seeing the growing threat of bi-nationalism, they might well prefer the solution of a homogeneous Jewish nation-state.³⁷ The lack of a solution to the geopolitical dispute between Israel and the PA and the inequality between Jews and Arabs in Israel increase the chance of a confrontation between the two population groups inside Israel.

These processes of radicalization, exclusion, and infringement of minority rights are taking place at a time when the attitude toward human rights is changing in the world and globalization and decolonization are increasing, leading to condemnation of the mistreatment of minorities. At the same time, especially in

³⁶ Yiftachel, 1996; Peled and Shafir, 2005.

³⁷ A survey published by Israeli and Palestinian scholars in March 2010 showed that 71% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians supported the two-state solution. Only 24% of the Israelis and 29% of the Palestinians supported the solution of a single, bi-national state. See PSR – Survey Research Unit, 20 March 2010.

Europe, Islamophobia and xenophobia are increasing, and parties of the right are attracting voters who wish to restrict Muslim immigration. In the early twenty-first century, the equilibrium between these processes leans in the direction of human rights discourse and decolonization. Against this background, relations between Israel and Europe have deteriorated, and rifts are appearing in relations with the liberal community in the US: Israel finds itself subject to increasing criticism from progressives and liberals. Conversely, Israel enjoys support from the more conservative community – especially among Republicans in the US and rightist circles in Europe. Exacerbation of relations between Judeo-Christian civilization and Muslim and Confucian civilizations is likely to augment support for Israel.

The crisis point could be a regional military conflict intended to prevent nuclear proliferation. A regional conflict, which is liable to deteriorate into a confrontation between the nations of the West and Iran or Pakistan, could create favorable conditions for action by nationalists on both sides who are interested in bringing relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel to a head. On the Israeli side, these circles might act to create a homogeneous Jewish nation-state, whereas on the Arab side they might act to create a bi-national state. Despite the enormous difference between these two possibilities, homogeneous Jewish nation-state vs. bi-national state, their similarity is evident. In both of them, the driving mechanism is national and the political model is based on physical and national separation and on the implementation of democracy within societies that are homogeneous from the national point of view.

Ideologies

The geopolitical struggle between Jews and Arabs in Israel and between Israel and the PA is anchored in two conflicting ideologies: nationalism in support of a Jewish nation-state versus nationalism that rejects a Jewish nation-state. The ideology espousing a Jewish nation-state is based on emphasis of the historical connection of the Jews to their ancestral land, on their right of self-determination, and on the fact that the Jewish nation-state has been recognized by the family of nations. Consequently, the Arabs in Israel are expected to recognize the existence of the State of Israel as the nation-state where the Jewish people exercises the right of self-determination. This demand is categorically rejected by the nationalism that opposes the Jewish national state. The leaders of this movement of rejection in Israel are the educated elites, and abroad it is the Palestinian regime, with public support.

In four “vision documents” that were published in 2006 and 2007 by members of the educated Arab elite in Israel, Jewish settlement in Palestine is described as a colonial process of dispossession. They depict what Jews regard as the people’s return to their land as a forcible and immoral process that deprives the local population of the space in which they had lived for many years. On the political level, the demand is raised to change the state from one that defines itself as Jewish and democratic to a non-Jewish democratic state. On the civic level, the state is called upon to adopt a policy of affirmative action toward the Arab community of Israel. On the historical level, the State of Israel is called upon to acknowledge the injustice it has committed and to act to correct it. The vision document published by the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, states:

Israel is the result of colonial action instigated by the Zionist Jewish elite in Europe and the West, it was established with the help of colonial powers, and it has been strengthened in the shadow of the augmentation of Jewish immigration to Palestine in the light of the results of the Second World War and the Holocaust. After its establishment in 1948, Israel continued implementing a policy derived from its view of itself as a representative of the West in the Middle East, and it continued to confront its surroundings constantly, on various levels. Thus, it continued to apply an internal colonial policy against the Arab and Palestinian citizens.³⁸

The vision document is calling for changing the nature of the Jewish state and replacing it with a consociational democracy whose nature remains vague, but between the lines there is a conspicuous call for equalizing the national status of the groups, and ultimately replacing the nation-state with a bi-national state.

The Haifa Declaration, published by the Mada al-Carmel – Arab Center for Applied Social Research, also regards the Zionist movement as colonial, dispossessive, and repressive, and declares loyalty to the homeland, to the Palestinian people, and to Arabic Islamic culture. The declaration recognizes the right of the Israeli Jewish people to self-determination and expresses identification with the victims of the Holocaust. At the same time the Haifa Declaration calls for equality of national rights and turning the Jewish state into a democratic state

³⁸ See the vision document formulated by the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006.

based on national and civil equality between the two national groups.³⁹ The vision document of the Mossawa Center – The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, written by Yousef Jabareen, demands full equality in the normative area, including the definition of the character of the state, the symbols of the state, and processes of immigration and naturalization.⁴⁰ The vision doctrine of Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, calls for replacement of the Jewish State by a multicultural state, suggesting possible models such as Belgium as a consociational democracy or that of Quebec as an example of territorial autonomy in a federal framework.⁴¹

The Arab elites in Israel believe that their vision documents show the way to reconciliation and strengthening their participation in the institutions of the state and in setting policy. The documents testify to the self-confidence of the second and third generations, who have freed themselves from the paternalism and co-optation that characterized the first generation. In their view, these documents reflect their taking the reins of leadership and assuming responsibility for their own fate, while at the same time severing themselves from the PA. They do acknowledge the right of the State of Israel to exist, and they recognize the Israeli Jewish people's right to self-determination, but not that of the Jewish people as a whole, and they give clear expression to the desire to advance democracy through cooperation and division of power between the two national groups. The claims made are basically a call to open the door to the Arab public and to enable them to participate in the state with an attitude of respect and equality.

That which the Palestinian-Arab elite in Israel views as a path leading to reconciliation appears to the central stream of the Jewish public as a path leading to confrontation. The Palestinian narrative, which ignores the rights of the Jewish people to the land and defines Zionism as a movement of colonial settlement, regarding the Palestinians as a victim, is rejected out of hand. The recognition of the right to self-determination appears to be a highly reserved kind of recognition, which is far from even-handed. Recognition is restricted to the Israeli Jewish people and denies that right to the Jewish people as a whole, and it is hedged in by the creation of a bi-national state with various expressions: consociational

³⁹ See the Haifa Declaration, published by Mada al-Carmel, 2007. Among other things, the declaration states: "At the end of the nineteenth century, the Zionist movement began its colonial settlement activity in Palestine. Later, the Zionist movement, in coordination with world colonialism and with the agreement of reactionary Arabs, began to implement its project, the purpose was conquest of our homeland and fulfillment of the aspiration to make it into a Jewish state." P.9.

⁴⁰ See Position Paper, Yousef Jabareen, 2006.

⁴¹ Adalah, the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, 2007.

democracy, multi-cultural democracy, or a bi-national state. Indeed, the common denominator of all these versions of the future state is that it will not be a nation-state, such as will arise in Palestine, but a state divided between two national groups. In this way the Palestinians would receive one nation-state and half of the State of Israel. Moreover, they leave intact the conception of dismantling the State of Israel in stages. The first stage would be a bi-national or multicultural democracy, which would not be Jewish. In the second stage, according to the principle of equality and implementation of the Palestinian right of return, the gates of the country would be thrown open to Arab immigration. Since the Jews are a tiny minority in the Middle East, full equality in immigration and naturalization would mean the disappearance of the Jewish majority within a short time, and concomitantly the denial of the Jewish people's right to self-determination in its historical homeland. The counter-argument commonly voiced by some of the Arab elites is that the Jews are a religious group, and religious affiliation cannot confer national rights. At most it will be possible to maintain a Jewish society within the Arab majority, as was the case for centuries.

The Arab narrative, as expressed in the vision documents and the demands raised in them, is rejected by most of the Jewish community, except for post- and anti-Zionists. It has been claimed that Israeli security bodies regard these vision documents as a strategic threat. To use figurative language, one might say that the demand put forward by the Arab elites to allow them entry by opening doors and hearts was met with a response that insists on shutting the doors and double-locking them.

What is surprising with respect to ideology on both sides is the preservation of political models and patterns of thinking over time, and the inability to begin a joint dialogue around the claims that have been advanced.⁴² The arguments raised by the Palestinian intellectuals today were already presented by the Supreme Arab Council to the Peel Commission in 1937, and they were raised again before UNSCOP the special commission appointed by the UN to examine the situation in Palestine in 1947.⁴³ The vision documents of the Arabs in Israel resemble a new edition of old ideas that have been in circulation in the region for more than seventy years.⁴⁴ Viewed in retrospect, the vision documents appear to have had a varied influence on relations between Jews and Arabs. On the one

⁴² A similar claim regarding the maintenance of geopolitical and ideological patterns of thought has been made by Rashid Khalidi (2010) in his book, "The Iron Cage."

⁴³ For a collection of these documents, see Gavison, 2009.

⁴⁴ Gavison, *ibid.*

hand, they strengthened the self-confidence of the Arab elites in Israel. They proved that in Israel an Arab elite had emerged which was dealing with building up the nation, and they strengthened its status within the Arab community in Israel and among liberal circles in the world. On the other hand, they brought about radicalization of the relations between Jews and Arabs. The proposed discriminatory and exclusivist legislation, demanding loyalty oaths by non-Jews who become naturalized citizens, making the acceptance of Arabs in Jewish settlements dependent on admission committees, preference in employment to those who have served in the army, the letter of the rabbis against renting apartments to Arabs, and the demonstrations by Jews against Arabs are all part of this radicalization.

This ideological review shows that the confrontation scenario is based not only on the geopolitical conflict but also on the cultural interpretations that the two sides give to concepts such as equality, nation, self-determination, history, and sovereignty. These interpretations, as Clifford Geertz has shown, are anchored in different codes. In the case of the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, it seems that the path of coming to know the social codes is blocked, and that no one has the ability to create an overlap between the coordinates of meaning. The result is 'a confusion of tongues', misunderstanding, and an increased possibility of confrontation.⁴⁵

Psychological and Cognitive Changes within the Jewish and Arab Communities

Against the background of these historical and ideological processes, a strong feeling of persecution and victimization has grown up within the Jewish community. According to this feeling, the Israeli Arabs are part of the present wave of persecution along with other persecutors, i.e. with anti-Semitic Europe; with Ahmadinejad, who is merely a modern Hitler; with Erdogan, the Islamist who is pursuing a radical geopolitical policy, and with Barack Hussein Obama, who grovels before Islam for political and ideological reasons, abandoning without a twinge of conscience those who were his allies until recently. The feeling of persecution within the Jewish community breaks down the frameworks of law and justice of the nation-state and leads to a connection with the lachrymose history of the persecuted Jewish people – a history that receives renewed interpretation, shaping their relation to reality. The Jewish interpretation undermines discourse

⁴⁵ Geertz, 1973.

about rights and leads to an ideology of alienation and enmity. The Arabs in Israel are seen as a threat. A prevalent attitude is that instead of advancing the rights of the Arabs one should work toward retracting their rights and freedoms.

Among the Arabs there is also a constant feeling of victimization derived from the 1948 *Nakba* (Catastrophe) and the *Naksa* (setback) of 1967, accompanied by a constant fear that past events will be repeated. The Arabs suffered from the confiscation of land after 1948, from the reduction of the municipal boundaries of their settlements, from political exclusion, and from continued discrimination and deprivation of government funds and resources. All of these factors give them a solid basis for continuing to fear further blows to their basic rights, continued confiscation of land, and transfer.⁴⁶ The fears and the feelings of victimization are heightened by the deep inequality, the unequal distribution of public resources, exclusion from the political and legislative system, and exclusionary and restrictive legislation. In this manner, each side regards itself as an innocent, persecuted victim. Justice is all on one side. The sons of light do battle against the sons of darkness.

Social Changes

The discourse of persecution and victimization has taken over large parts of the public on both sides, and the elites take a major part in fostering it. Research institutes, critical scholars, and NGOs lend legitimacy to the new discourse by means of scholarly research and publication. Inequality, separation, and restriction all intensify the discourse on persecution among the Arabs. The media, constantly in search of expressions of extremism, also makes the discourse more abrasive because of its tendency to focus on extremist elements and to neglect what takes place in the center. As a result, movement in constructive directions is constantly ignored, though it consists of various groups among both Jews and Arabs that are active in creating a new field of the frontier of democracy.⁴⁷ This field has enormous potential for improving relations, but it is neglected and regarded as

⁴⁶ A comprehensive survey of unequal treatment of the Arab community appears in Peled and Shafir, 2005, Yiftachel and Kedar, 2000. A touching literary expression of fear of transfer can be found in Sayed Kashua's book, *Let it be Morning*, 2004.

⁴⁷ The frontier of democracy is discussed at length in Hasson, 2007, as well as in the section presenting the scenario of reconciliation. Whereas the discourse prevalent in scenarios of conflict and liminality is about the borders set by nationalism, the frontier of democracy deals with a field where Jews and Arabs meet and act to promote democracy and the human rights of the minority. Emphasis is shifted from the borders of the national paradigms to a space of democracy which lies in-between the borders with emphasis on universal rights.

cut off from the threatening reality spreading over the country. In a situation of radicalization and confrontation, everything is seen in black and white. Anyone who is not with us is against us. With simplistic views like these, there is no place for the complex messages that characterize a significant part of the public on both sides.

Political Changes

Populist politicians on both sides identify the existing polarized discourse and exacerbate it. Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli Foreign Minister as this is written, is skillful in reading the ideological map and offers a solution to the situation: removal of the Arabs in every dimension – political, social, and geographical. On the other side, some of the Arab politicians work to strengthen their position by emphasizing the motif of national struggle, and by calling for dismantling of the state in its present form. They place themselves at the head of the critics, board flotillas intended to break the blockade on Gaza, and join forces with hostile elements, and some of them have even been arrested and put on trial.⁴⁸ The politicians ride the deep wave of mutual resentment, exploit it to amass political capital, and contribute to further extremism with their actions.

The Exercise of Power

Ideological, psychological, and social changes are translated into action by means of Jewish political and economic control over the mechanisms of the state. The most pronounced expression of this is the continuing exclusion and discrimination, and the many proposed pieces of legislation designed to restrict Arab leaders. Conversely, these actions have been met with Palestinian power, the source of which is the rise of a stratum of intellectuals who are concerned with rebuilding their nation. This activity receives moral and judicial support in the world, and is also supported by the changes in the demographic balance and the geographical concentration of the Arabs in the north, center, and south of the country.

⁴⁸ Azmi Bishara, who was the leader of the Balad movement and represented it in the Knesset is suspected of aiding Hizballah and has fled from Israel. Knesset Member Hanin Zoubi, who was on the Mavi Marmaris boat, which was stopped on its way to break through the blockade of Gaza, provided the excuse to propose legislation intended to remove Knesset members who engage in actions regarded as being intended against the state. The head of the Itijah, the union of Arab NGOs, Ameer Makhoul, was arrested on suspicion of aiding and abetting the enemy and was sentenced to nine years in prison.

Patterns of the Confrontation Scenario

The persistent conflict and the use of violence has created a binary relationship toward the population under the control of the State of Israel, i.e., those who are partially included in Israeli democracy (the Israeli Arabs) and those who are under occupation (the Palestinians in the West Bank). However, over time this binary relationship has been gradually blurred, and the processes that have been taking place on the West Bank are transferred to the State of Israel. The result is a change in the attitude toward the population of different areas and the creation of twilight zones between the territories and the state. In these twilight zones, the struggle between Jews and Arabs is more intense, especially in the mixed cities, and in the Bedouin settlements in the south.

Within Israel the pattern taking shape is that of a nationalizing state with an ethnocratic regime. In the areas where Israel rules militarily, a de facto bi-national region is emerging, which could become a de facto bi-national state. This course of events is the result of the deep struggle, the growing feeling of persecution and victimization, the increase in inequality, the strengthening of extremist factors, and the extremist ideologies fostered by them. The forces of moderation are likely to find themselves relegated to the margins, without any real influence, and some of them might join the radical forces.

This situation is highly charged and liable to lead to a collision between the national elites of the respective camps, which will rapidly escalate into a confrontation between the members of the two groups. This confrontation could be irredentist; it could take the form of a civil war, of transfer, or, alternatively, of the collapse of the regime and the emergence of a bi-national state. As a result of the deep conflict, the nationalist forces in the Jewish sector might take preemptive and deterrent steps against the nationalist forces in the Arab camp, and this could cause the retreat of democracy to a *nationalizing state* characterized by more stringent control over the Arab minority and the neutralization of factors regarded as threatening.⁴⁹ A highly important factor at this stage is the power available to the groups. If the conflict takes place in a situation where the Arabs have a great deal of power, the retreat from democracy to a *nationalizing state* is likely to encounter stiff opposition, to receive international assistance from abroad, and to lead to irredentism, or to a change in the existing regime, from a unitary to a *bi-national* state with a federal regime. The possible emergence of a bi-national state following a conflict would not be unique to Israel. It was the result of the

⁴⁹ Development of the concept of a nationalizing state can be found in Brubacker 1995; 1996; 1998. The regime in a nationalizing state is ethnocratic.

civil war that took place in the aftermath of the collapse of Yugoslavia. The Dayton Accords, which were forced on the two sides by the Americans in 1995, led to the creation of a bi-national state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That state was composed of two sub-states, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, which joined Muslim Bosnians with Roman Catholic Croatians (not without great tension), and the Serbian Christian Republika Srpska.⁵⁰ If the extremist Jewish community is powerful and acts without restraint, free of international intervention, the conflict is likely to end with transfer and the creation of *a homogeneous Jewish nation-state*.

A Nationalizing State with an Ethnocratic Regime

In the course of the confrontation between Jews and Arabs in Israel a form of national hegemony would emerge in which the Arabs are second-class citizens, deprived of rights in areas that the national majority regards as vital for its security and for the preservation of its culture and way of life. In this state, the status of Arabic as an official language, though not the dominant one, would be negligible. The only official language in use would be Hebrew. Jewish-Israeli culture would be the official culture, and it would be dominant in the schools and the public space. A special commission would function to retain the demographic dominance, and the public allocation of land and resources would be solely for the Jewish population. The state and all its arms would adopt a policy of exclusion, and in its actions it would systematically deprive the Arab minority in the areas of the economy, the society, land, and space. The Jewish majority would have hegemonic status in the political arena, and the Arabs would be second-class citizens. Contrary to the situation today, the state would as a matter of principle avoid all its responsibilities for maintaining a balance between nationalism and citizenship and would emphasize nationality and nationalization. The justification for this position would be anchored in the prolonged conflict with the PA and with some of the Arab states and the sympathy shown by the Arab public in Israel toward their compatriots. In this situation the Arab minority would suffer from economic and social marginality and would not be able to maintain and develop its culture. Some of its members would assimilate, but

⁵⁰ A bi-national state could also emerge from the scenario of reconciliation as a result of a compromise agreement between two sides. It could take on various forms: a federation, a consociational democracy, or Arab autonomy within the State of Israel. What is important is to clarify the mechanisms that would lead to this result, for as is evident, a bi-national state can be the result of various, even contrary processes.

others would display opposition to the regime's policy of repression. The result would be the imposition of restrictions on the Arab public, increased supervision and control, and a widening rift between the majority and the minority. One of the results could be irredentism and civil war within Israel.

Irredentism and Civil War

Irredentism and civil war would be the result of a nationalizing policy that discriminated against the Arab minority in Israel economically, socially, culturally, and politically. With respect to demography, the Arab minority in Israel would become a quarter of the population, and the data would point to increased growth. Despite the demographic growth and the fact that the Arab community would number 2.5 million, there would be no substantial change in policy. The Arabs would enjoy civil and political rights, but the Jewish majority would be accorded privileges in the areas of land allocation, economic development, and control of positions of power. The policy of discrimination would lead to dissatisfaction, ferment, denial of the legitimacy of the political system, and ultimately to active resistance by the Arab populace. The approach that advocates awarding preference to the Jewish majority, justified by security considerations, would be seen as blatant injustice, emasculating the meaning of democracy. Arab opposition would receive support from some of the Jewish community who were committed to liberal democratic principles, as well as from NGOs elsewhere in the world and various governments.

A humanitarian crisis within the Arab minority would make world public opinion aware of their distress and lead to diplomatic intervention in Israel. This intervention would be intensified by Arab public figures and intellectuals and some of their Israeli Jewish colleagues. They would work together to bring events in Israel to worldwide attention. The discrimination would arouse ferment within the Arab minority and among the Palestinians in the PA. Ideological and paramilitary groups would be formed, seeking to make national affiliation congruent with political boundaries. The connection between the national minority in Israel and the Palestinians beyond the borders of the state would intensify because of the continued occupation and the increasing oppression of the Palestinian people.

In such a situation, the identification of the Arab minority in Israel with its compatriots in the PA would increase, and many of them would begin to work for change in the geopolitical situation. It could begin with support and assistance for acts of terror and expand to become a struggle for protection of holy places, civil disobedience, connection with military organizations, identification with

the states at war with Israel, and continued action to change the geographical boundaries of the State of Israel. If the PA had the necessary resources and power, and the Arab states were to intervene on its side, this would lead to a change in the borders and the partition of the state.

In that situation, the State of Israel would shrink to the areas where there was a Jewish majority: the center of the country, the coastal plain, and the northern Negev. Border areas that had been ignored by Israel, where the Arab population had become a majority, would be transferred to the Arabs. The example that would be much cited would be Kosovo, because of the Muslim demographic majority, and because of the support by NATO and the West for separation of the region from Serbia. If the PA lacked the necessary forces, the conflict would grow fiercer and be accompanied by frequent attacks on lives and property, mass deportations, and even by outside intervention, as happened in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

A Bi-National State

Slipping into a bi-national state would be gradual. At first, if Israel remains in the West Bank, a de facto bi-national space would be created. Later, a bi-national state would be imposed and, finally, penetrating discussions would be held about the possibility of creating a bi-national state through agreement. In the discussions, at first the possibility would be entertained of creating an Israeli nation, and a shared Israeli identity: a state of all its citizens. However, this possibility would be ruled out because of the tendency of both groups to defend their national affiliations and to retain the connection with their past and with their diasporas. Against this background, it would be proposed that each people should retain its national and cultural identity while aspiring to create a bi-national state that would treat all its citizens equally.⁵¹

The basic tendency would be to create a consociational democracy that offers full equality to the minority in every area: civil rights, politics, the economy, recognition of identity and of national and cultural affiliation. This would mean a change in the laws of immigration to Israel, the law governing land ownership, and arrangements between the government, the Jewish Agency, and the World Zionist Organization. Similarly, this would require a change in those basic laws whose purpose is to anchor in law the Jewish and democratic character of the State of Israel; the repeal of laws that give implicit preference to Jews, including

⁵¹ Ghanem, 1999:298.

those that do so by reason of military service; full separation between religion and the state; and a change in the symbols of the state. The two groups would enjoy full autonomy in the fields of education and culture, with coordination of education policy regarding general subjects.⁵²

The guiding ideal would be that of consociational democracy, the expressions of which are: (1) a broad political coalition among large portions of the elites of the two groups responsible for governing the state; (2) a mutual veto right for both groups to prevent damage to the interests of either of them; (3) equal representation of the two groups in political and public institutions; (4) internal autonomy for each of the two groups in education, culture, and local government, which could be personal, institutional, or territorial in character.⁵³

A number of factors might support the emergence of a bi-national state: the possible relative increase in the Arab population because of higher fertility rates and a decrease in Jewish immigration to Israel, continued neglect of the Arabs by the institutions of the government, modernization and a rise in the education level in the Arab public, the creation of an educated stratum that strives to see its future within the borders of Israel as a separate national group and as citizens of equal status, the “Israelification” of the Arab public, support on the part of liberal Jewish circles for equality and recognition of the collective rights of the minority. These processes would be accompanied by the building of national institutions such as the Higher Follow-up Committee for the Arab Citizens in Israel and advocacy and service organizations with national orientations and connections with civil society.

Appeals to the Supreme Court and decisions supporting collective rights would also further a bi-national solution. Globalization and the universal call for human rights and minority rights would intensify these processes. Especially prominent would be the role of international organizations and foreign governments, who would intervene in the allocation of resources and demand equal rights in Israel for humanitarian reasons. The symbiosis between local organizations within Israel and international bodies, which would be expressed, among other ways, by the transfer of resources and diplomatic support, would intensify the pressure on Israel and gradually cause withdrawal from the concept of a nation-state where the Jewish people fulfills its right to self-determination.

⁵² See the detailed discussion of the nature of a bi-national state and the vital conditions for its existence in Rouhana, 1999.

⁵³ Lijphart, 1977.

Along with factors supporting a bi-national state, others militate against it. There is no trust among the chief groups in the Jewish and Arab publics, given the background of the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Arab world. Most of the Jewish public regards the Arab public as a potential danger. This attitude is anchored in the support for the PA among the Arabs in Israel, in the threat entailed by the demand to exercise the Palestinians' right of return as their solution of the refugee problem, including the internal refugees. The demand on the part of the Arab minority to change the immigration laws, to repair the injustices of the past by affirmative action, and for the extensive transfer of state resources, including the reopening of the 1948 files and the restoration of land or generous compensation; all these intensify Jewish opposition to a bi-national solution.

Additional controversy would arise in response to the Arab demand to remake the nature and identity of the state, including its symbols and myths. The connections between Israeli Palestinian organizations and Arab and Palestinian organizations abroad in the effort to condemn or isolate Israel in international commissions strengthens criticism of the Arab elite among Jewish liberal groups and intensifies opposition to a bi-national solution. The fact that during the seventy years of the state's existence the demographic relation between Jews and Arabs has not changed substantially, and that immigration from the former USSR actually changed this relation in favor of the Jewish public (if one does not include the presence of the Arabs of East Jerusalem, most of whom are not citizens of Israel) diminishes perception of a demographic threat and the tendency to change the status quo.

Those who point out the disadvantages of a bi-national solution argue that, institutionally, the agencies of such a government would not have the necessary power to ensure democracy and equality, and that they would be in deep disagreement regarding the way to achieve the goals of the state.⁵⁴ The expected confrontation between the forces pushing for a bi-national state and those that oppose it would bring the system to the threshold of a bi-national state, but without the capacity to establish it. That is to say, there would be declarations and agreements about bi-national arrangements, but the government would not have the legitimate authority to implement such an agreement. In that situation, it can be assumed that the confrontation would continue and the system would enter a long period of instability, as has happened in other countries which have sought a bi-national solution: Belgium, Cyprus (in the past), Lebanon, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁵⁴ Hasson, Ben Bassat, Feitelson, Halevy, Neeman, Newman, Sela, Sabel, 2011.

The confrontation scenario assumes, as stated at the start of this chapter, that the conflict between Israel and the PA will continue. However, even if a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine were signed, this would be no guarantee that the internal conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel would be mitigated. On the contrary, such an agreement could even intensify that conflict. The Arabs in Israel could demand, as stated in the Arab vision documents, national equality in the form of a bi-national state. The Jewish public would oppose this vehemently. It would argue that the agreement signed with the PA was based on recognition of the existence of two nation states, and that there was no justification for the Israeli Arabs to demand an additional half of a nation-state. If the demand of the Arabs in Israel for the establishment of a bi-national state were to receive the support of the neighboring states, this would be interpreted as denial of the signed agreement. Under these conditions, even the liberal Jewish community would probably join those opposed to the idea of a bi-national state.

The tension between those supporting a bi-national state in the form of a consociational democracy and those hostile to its establishment could lead to an explosion and the removal of the idea from the agenda. It could also lead to other models of a bi-national state that reflect various solutions for the tension between living together or separately. These models are: a federation within the State of Israel, a federation between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, Arab autonomy within Israel, exchange of populations with or without agreement, and the creation of a homogeneous Jewish state.

The Possibility of a Federation within the State of Israel (in the 1967 borders, with modifications)

Such a federation could be created in the course of a confrontation or as the result of agreement. A confrontation, which might deteriorate into a civil war in the territory under Israeli control, could be ended by international intervention in the region. A precedent for this already exists in the form of international intervention in severe conflicts in which the two sides find it difficult to reach a solution by themselves. An example of this is the Dayton Accords of 1995 between the Bosnians and the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That agreement created two autonomous sub-states: the Republika Srpska and the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Above these is a bridging political framework without the ability to rule: the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such an agreement, were it to be reached between Israel and the Arabs inside Israel, would not do away with the burden of hostility between the two sides. The bi-national federal state

would mainly exist on paper. In reality there would be two sub-states. Under such conditions, the State of Israel, as it is recognized by international law today, would be liable to lose the areas with a majority Arab population in the Negev, the Galilee, and the center of the country.

If a federation were to be established by agreement, the two parties would come to understand that the solution to the tension was an egalitarian democratic state that preserved national identities, maintained cultural separation, and enjoyed self-rule nearly amounting to partition. The federation would be established on the basis of an understanding on the part of the Jewish public that the only way to retain its status in the wake of demographic change would be by reaching a political arrangement giving each nation the possibility of self-rule. Forfeiting political and economic hegemony and a change in the legal system would be seen under those conditions as the lesser of evils.

Movement toward a federation would be slow: personal and institutional autonomy for the Arab minority, a combination of institutional and territorial autonomy at a more advanced stage, and finally a federation with a dominant Jewish majority that would decline progressively in the wake of demographic processes. The federal arrangement could be accompanied by a consociational democracy along the lines of Belgium. Modernization, economic development, a rise in educational level, and increasing secularization would provide elements supportive of the federal model. On the other hand, the small size of the state and the migration of Arabs to Jewish cities would make it difficult to establish the federal model and would require institutional arrangements within the nationally heterogeneous territories. Farther down the line, perhaps the connection to the national entities would weaken, and civic affiliation might grow stronger.

The Possibility of a Weak Federation of the Jewish and Palestinian Nations in the Area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan

The establishment of a federation could result from a number of factors. One of these is Israel's refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and to allow the establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, whose capital would be East Jerusalem. This refusal might be coupled with opposition to the existence of a Palestinian state with full sovereignty over its territory and clear borders with the neighboring states. The Israeli presence in the heart of the West Bank and along the Jordan, the continued blockade of the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli demands for demilitarization of a potential Palestinian state, for the provision of air corridors over its territory for flights to and from Israel,

and for shared exploitation of the water sources demonstrate the hopelessness of any plan for establishing an independent Palestinian state from the political point of view. Awareness of this is increasing among the Palestinians because of the creation of Palestinian cantons, isolated from one another due to the presence of Jewish settlements deep in the West Bank, which do away with any possibility of creating a contiguous Palestinian state from the territorial point of view. Economic dependence on Israel also makes it doubtful whether it would be possible to establish an independent Palestinian state from the economic point of view.

The elites in Israel, on the right but also on the post-Zionist left, do not support an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 borders whose capital would be East Jerusalem, and it is difficult to imagine a Palestinian leader who would agree to give up something so symbolically central as sovereignty in East Jerusalem and the Muslim holy places. Under these conditions, the Palestinian elites could well redefine their attitude toward the possibility of a bi-national state and prefer it over the politically and economically hopeless solution of two independent states. In the short run, such a state could be characterized by three different models of democracy: a *Herrenvolk* democracy such as existed in South Africa under apartheid, in relation to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; an ethnocracy with respect to the Arab minority in the State of Israel and liberal democracy with respect to the Jewish community; and, with the change in the demographic relations between the Jewish and Arab communities, a consociational democracy could emerge. These trends would be accelerated in the aftermath of a prolonged civil war in which the political boundaries between the Palestinians in Israel and those living outside the state would be blurred.

A Homogeneous Jewish Nation-state

This scenario might be the result of a political attitude that sought to create a homogeneous nation-state based on political separation between Jews and Arabs. Such a state would reflect the increasing apprehension within the Jewish community regarding the formation of a bi-national state in one of the versions presented above. In dialectical fashion, the likelihood of a bi-national state would create a counter-tendency advocating separation and the exchange of population.⁵⁵ This trend is already evident in right-wing parties such as Yisrael Beiteinu. It also arose in the talks between Tzipi Livni and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen),

⁵⁵ See Lieberman's plan for population exchange in Caspit, 2004.

and it is acceptable to many in the Israeli centrist parties. Although at this stage only a minority in the Arab community of Israel accepts the idea, continued discrimination and exclusion in Israel along with improvement of the conditions in the PA might cause larger parts of the Arab community to support the idea. Those in favor of it on the Jewish side would maintain that ultimately they were not talking about transfer but about the exchange of population and territories with the PA, or about granting limited territorial autonomy in Israel to the Arab citizens living there.

The Possibility of Population Exchange by Agreement

The exchange of populations would be intended to increase the national homogeneity of the State of Israel and of the future Palestinian state. The scenario of population exchange could be implemented if a peace agreement involving the exchange of territory were signed with the PA. In an effort to advance peace, it would be agreed between the two parties that on either side of the border there would be a homogeneous state containing the smallest possible presence of the other nation. In such an arrangement, most of the Jewish settlers would be concentrated in a limited number of settlement blocs, which would go to Israel. In compensation for the land ceded to Israel, the Palestinians would receive the same amount of land which could include, among other places, the area of the Triangle. The exchange of land would receive the support of the PA and the countries of the world that are interested in promoting a political solution. Arab residents of the Triangle who wanted to remain in the State of Israel which defined itself as a Jewish state, would have to swear allegiance to it and take upon themselves the duties incumbent upon a citizen of the state.

The Possibility of Limited Autonomy

Another possibility of a homogeneous Jewish state would be the transmission of some authority to a number of areas with large concentrations of Arab population. In this way, limited autonomy would be possible, offering a low level of administering local and regional life. The price would be the lack of Arab representation in the central centers of power of the state. The purpose of such autonomy would be to isolate and exclude the Arab public from the decision-making process. In both instances, of population exchange and limited autonomy, democracy would suffer. Population transfer, even if agreed upon with the Palestinian state, would not be accepted by the Arab minority in Israel, most of whom oppose transfer of this kind. Limited autonomy, excluding the

Arab public from political life, would damage the democratic nature of the State of Israel, and it would be widely condemned throughout the world. While some Jewish Israelis would add their voice to these condemnations, the nationalist sentiment that would sweep over the Jewish majority would reject this criticism and argue that severe measures should be taken against the Jewish “softies.”

THE LIMINAL SCENARIO

Liminal thinking is not new in the relations between Jews and Arabs. From the 1920s to the early twenty-first century, various movements have made proposals regarding cooperation that reached across national boundaries. The Palestine Communist Party tried from the start to overcome the national division by creating a class alliance across borders. After the establishment of the state, the Israeli Communist Party stuck to that line and developed a class-based ideological platform intended to join Jews and Arabs together. At the same time, Jewish circles raised ideas of creating a bi-national state. These circles included Brit Shalom (“Covenant of Peace”) in the 1920s, and in the 1940s by the Ihud (Unity) party.⁵⁶ A third stream that tries to create cross-border connections is the post-national, liberal stream, which advocates the creation of a state of all its citizens or of all its nations, or a state of two republics.⁵⁷ The historical developments would be less dramatic but would contribute considerably to the creation of an unclear situation, confusion, and perplexity in the relations between Jews and Arabs. In this scenario, I will describe these processes and their consequences.

The liminal scenario presented below could develop in three different directions: confrontation, as outlined in the previous section; stagnation; or the start of reconciliation. First, I will explain the mechanism of the scenario, and then I will present the possible political and social outcomes.

The Mechanism of the Liminal Scenario

Geopolitical History

The establishment of the State of Israel, the *Nakba*, and the creation of a rigid and impermeable border between Israel and her neighbors brought about a hesitant rapprochement between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and a process that could be called “Israelification” took place in the Arab community. This rapprochement took place in stages. The first generation of Israeli Arabs was characterized by a frightened identity, but also with a defiant identity that preserved its nationalism and hope to return to the destroyed homeland. The second generation drew closer to Israeli culture and was characterized by divided identities that moved between

⁵⁶ Heller, 2000.

⁵⁷ Peled and Shafir propose that Israel should be based on two republics – Jewish and Palestinian – each of which would administer its domestic affairs on its own, and they would cooperate on matters that demand cooperation. See Peled and Shafir, 2005, p. 169.

rapprochement and withdrawal inward, between acceptance and defiance. The third generation continued these divided trends. On the one hand, it is a proud generation, prepared to struggle for its rights; but on the other hand it is a generation that seeks to be accepted as an equal in the state and the society. This distinction among the generations is of course rather schematic and artificial. Frequently all three generations dwell simultaneously in a single person.

The 1967 war and the devastating defeat suffered by the Arabs (the *Naksa*) created a confused identity, both Palestinian and Israeli, moving between two worlds. Continued Israeli control of the occupied territories fostered a cloudy identity connected to the bi-national space. In that space the encounter took place between the Arab citizen who lived in Israel and the Palestinian compatriot who lived on the West Bank or in Gaza. This was an encounter laden with quite a bit of ambivalence: state vs. nation, citizenship vs. nationality, fraternization vs. difference.

The return to Judea and Samaria also caused quite a bit of confusion and perplexity among the Jews in Israel. For part of the community, this was a return to the Jewish map, the map of the patriarchs and the prophets, whereas for others it was the loss of the Israeli Zionist map that had been created up to 1967. Zionism has different meanings for these two groups: return to the sources of the Jewish people in Judea and Samaria and placing Zionism on the foundation of the expansion of settlement, versus destruction of the Zionist project by settlement in the territories. Different maps, different aspirations, different readings of history vie with one another, and the geopolitical situation is characterized by confusion and indecision.

Psychological and Cultural Changes in the Jewish Community

The geopolitical processes whose effect is notable among both Jews and Arabs in Israel create divided and fuzzy identities. Among the Jews, the divided identity moves among a number of polarities: the Jewish pole versus the Israeli pole; identification with the Jewish state versus identification with democracy; support for remaining in Judea and Samaria versus support for leaving the territories. Various groups in Jewish society propose ideas for hyphenated identities: Jewish-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli. And the character of the state is particularly vexing and raises questions. If it is democratic, it should be blind to national affiliation and treat all its citizens equally. If it is national, it should do just the opposite: it should be aware of national differences and give preference to Jews. On this point, as Chief Justice Aharon Barak has pointed out, some people demand preference

for democracy over nationalism, and others demand the opposite. In Barak's opinion, no a priori position can be taken, and each case must be examined on its own. He thus opts for pragmatism rather than a declaration of principles regarding the order preference.⁵⁸ While this approach is comfortable from the political and juridical standpoint, it does create cloudiness and lack of clarity. How can one pledge allegiance to a principle whose character must be spelled out from time to time, and which has no historical record that can make its practical essence clear? Against this background, Israeli Jewish thinkers have called for the creation of an Israeli nation-state. This would be a hybrid state that downplayed the old national bonds and replaced them with a new national affiliation, created by the State of Israel. Few people are prepared to accept this approach, which appears to be no more than a rerun of the old "Canaanite" program (reviving an ancient "Hebrew" nation, disconnected from the Jewish past, which would embrace the Middle East's Arab population as well).

Psychological and Cultural Changes in the Arab Community

Ambivalent identities typical of liminal situations also arose among the Arabs in Israel. They walk the tightrope between nationalism and citizenship, between Palestinian and Israeli Arab, giving different answers to the question, "Who am I, Palestinian, Israeli, or Arab?" in different situations. Their hesitations split the category of Arabs in Israel into sub-groups. One of these seeks to integrate into modern society and culture, expressing reservations about the cultural and social backwardness of Arab society and criticism of Arab regimes. Another group experiences double marginalization. They condemn the backwardness of traditional culture and express harsh criticism of the State of Israel, which deprives and excludes them. A third group withdraws into the history of their loss or into the Palestinian sphere. A fourth group wishes to be a bridge between the past and the rights of the indigenous residents of their homeland and the state, by way of equal participation in public life.⁵⁹

The fourth group is particularly interesting, because within its ranks are today's leading intellectuals in the Palestinian-Arab society of Israel. This group says that, while the establishment of the State of Israel caused injustice, one cannot ignore the fact of its existence or of the emergence of an Israeli-Jewish nation within the state. In the wake of the Oslo Agreements, which ignored the

⁵⁸ Barak, 2002.

⁵⁹ A comprehensive analysis of the liminal models in Israeli Arab society appears in Ghanem H. 2009.

Arab community in Israel, representatives of this group decided on the following strategy: henceforth they would represent themselves in matters with the State of Israel. This decision does not mean that they gave up the Arab national claims. On the contrary. True reconciliation, according to the views of this group, demands recognition of the existence of the native Arab national minority, which historically preceded the establishment of the state. Their claim is therefore not for more government financing or the right to live wherever they wish, but for recognition as an indigenous national minority, with collective rights which, in a well-ordered state, must not only be equal but also first among equals.


Accordingly, various proposals have been raised for changing the character of the state: creation of a state of all its citizens, creation of a bi-national state, the formation of a consociational democracy, giving autonomy and collective rights to the Arab minority. The four “vision documents” written by members of this group describe Zionist settlement as colonialism, dispossession, and injustice that will ultimately disappear and be replaced by a consociational democracy. This scenario, though it jars on Jewish-Zionist ears, is regarded by the group that designed it as a scenario of reconciliation on the part of the Arab-Palestinian public. It represents a historical turning point in the Palestinian view, which denied the right of the Jews to a nation-state until 1948. It recognizes the existence of the state and the nation that has been consolidated in it, and it aims at creating true historical partnership between Arabs and Jews, based on equality, not only on the civic level of budgetary allocations and representation but also in the substantial area of public life. In its own view, this group deals with Palestinian liminality by linking the past to the present, the homeland to the state, the feeling of injustice to recognition of reality. This is a clear scenario that advances from a situation of ruin, appropriation, and injustice to a future of just reparations in the image of a bi-national state or a consociational democracy, or cultural autonomy.

The encounter between Jewish and Palestinian-Arab liminality can develop into three entirely different situations: confrontation, stagnation, or improvement of the democracy. Insistence on rescinding the status of Israel as the state of the Jewish people could lead to *confrontation* (see the first scenario), whose results could be an ethnocracy, a bi-national space about to become a bi-national state, or a homogeneous Jewish state. A prolonged conflict without a decision could lead to *maintaining the situation*, which would mean perpetuating the existing system of ethnic democracy. The pragmatic demand for civic equality could lead to *improvement of the democracy*, advancing from the existing regime of ethnic democracy to an improved ethnic democracy.

Social Changes

The following factors will determine the direction of movement, i.e. the unfolding of the scenarios toward confrontation, stagnation, or improved democracy: the character of the leadership and especially discretion and realism in reading the situation by the public leaders on both sides; the kind of discourse that will develop between the two sides; the force available to the leadership of the two sides; demographic changes; the state of the geopolitical conflict; the degree of legitimacy and inner political support that can be mobilized; and local and international public opinion. All the foregoing are subject to a high degree of uncertainty and, as shown in Table 2, movement from the liminal state can be in various directions. Figure 1 presents the various groups taking part in the discourse. It shows that the general category of Jews and Arabs is not appropriate to the discussion of the liminal situation, and that distinctions must be drawn among various groups. The development of the scenarios depends to a great degree on the nature of the encounters between the groups and especially on the question of who gives it a distinctive tone.

Figure 1: The political ideology of various groups in Jewish and Arab society



Patterns of the Liminal Scenario

Confrontation

Confrontation could result if the central encounter takes place between groups with strong national affiliation and opposing views regarding the rules of the game that should characterize the regime in the state. The Palestinian-Arab national group (upper right quadrant in Figure 1) would demand symmetry, i.e. full equality, in national and civil status, whereas the Jewish national group (lower right quadrant) would insist on lack of symmetry, i.e. partial equality. In this situation, post-Zionist or post-nationalist circles in Jewish society (the upper left quadrant) would support the Arab position, and the conflict would take place between the nationalist groups on both sides and between the post-nationalist Jewish group and the nationalist Jewish group. The beginnings of such a conflict can already be traced in the Israeli arena, and it is likely to grow stronger in a situation of confrontation. Post-nationalist Jews will call for the imposition of a boycott on Israel and will join forces with nationalist Arab factors. This alliance would be temporary, since at bottom the Arab nationalists and the Jewish post-nationalists advocate different models of the state. The Arab nationalists would use the Jewish post-nationalists as long as this served their purpose, and they would break relations with them after receiving the necessary help.

The confrontation would also take place between Arabs with strong nationalism and a demand for full symmetry and Jewish intellectuals of the central stream of Zionism. These intellectuals do not accept the abandonment of Israel as a nation-state in which the Jewish people fulfills its right to self-determination, and they object the description of Zionist settlement as a criminal colonialist act. The Arabs' rejection of Israel and the accompanying narrative would make the Jewish intellectuals of the central stream revert to the old Zionist narrative. Accordingly, once again concepts would be presented that had almost been forgotten: the Jewish people's right to self-determination, recognition of this right by the family of nations, the historical connection of the Jewish people to its land.⁶⁰ In that respect, there would be no difference between the central stream of Zionism, as presented by the intellectuals, and the majority of the Jewish public. Both read the Palestinian scenario – including the one presented in the vision documents – as a subversive scenario intended to do away with Israel as a nation-state where the Jewish people fulfills its right to self-determination. The Palestinian Arabs in Israel, who see themselves as a bridge toward reconciliation,

⁶⁰ Yakobson and Rubinstein, 2003.

are viewed as a bridgehead for taking over the state and destroying its foundations. The Arabs of Israel, who see themselves as knocking on the door of the state in an effort to enter, view this reaction as slamming that door in their face, not only by those from whom such a response could have been expected, but also by those who would naturally be seen as allies.

In the scenario of the decline from liminality into confrontation, the conflict has many dimensions: within Jewish society, between the Zionists and post-Zionists; and within Israeli society, between representatives of the Jews and representatives of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. The interesting phenomenon is that recently rightists from among the settlers have joined forces with public figures such as the former Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, in calling for a bi-national state.⁶¹ The central stream of Zionism condemns this alliance and rejects it. The decline into confrontation is likely to be hastened if laws of restrictive and exclusionist character are enacted, such as making naturalization dependent on an oath of allegiance to the Jewish state, legislation that discriminates against Arabs in employment because they have not served in the army, or discriminatory legislation in acceptance in small settlements in the Galilee and the Negev. The results of the confrontation scenario are liable to be a homogeneous Jewish state or a bi-national state, as described in the previous scenario.

Maintaining the Existing Situation: Ethnic Democracy⁶²

This situation is the result of two contradictory processes taking place simultaneously. On the one hand, there is a fruitless struggle between the Palestinian-Arab national group, which demands symmetry in national and civil status, and the Jewish national group, which clings to the lack of symmetry as a lifeline. On the other hand there is a pragmatic exchange between the moderate national groups on both sides. The two processes collide with each other, and the pendulum swings from one side to another. The continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the identification of the Arabs in Israel with their compatriots strengthens the Jewish national group, which insists on lack of symmetry. The struggles are waged mainly in the political and judicial arena; the former tends toward extremism, and the latter is a moderating force. The political result of this situation is a twilight situation that takes the form of ethnic democracy.

⁶¹ Arens, June 6, 2010.

⁶² The model of ethnic democracy as an empirical given as well as a model with normative significance was developed by Sami Smooha, 1996.

In the ethnic democracy scenario, the geopolitical conflict with the PA and the Jewish-Arab rift within Israel would remain unchanged. The demographic relations would be stable. The leading groups on both sides would have strong national orientations and be in conflict with each other. Democracy in Israel would be republican in character, i.e. a democracy where the general good is determined by the Jewish majority according to its values, needs, and aspirations. This means that the public resources, including land, settlement, the allocation of public funds, would be subordinate to the values and needs of the majority. In this way the superiority of the Zionist project would be preserved, and the special connection between religion and the state would be frozen. The republican approach would reflect the historical struggle of the Jewish public to establish a nation-state in the Land of Israel and the need to continue defending that state. The defensive character of Israeli republican democracy would give individual and collective rights to the Jews but only individual rights to the Arabs. This would be a thin democracy, in which the Arabs had the right to vote and be elected, but they would not have equal access to public resources and positions of power. The distribution of public resources between Jews and Arabs would be unequal. This form of government would arouse discontent, alienation, and resentment among the Arabs and lead to frequent confrontations between the Arab public and the state.

The confrontation would become more intense because of the occupation and the identification of the Arabs in Israel with the Palestinian people. Demonstrations, declarations of support, and even practical and declarative support for armed struggle and support of terrorist organizations could cause the imposition of restrictions on the Arab community, despite the democratic tendencies of the arms of the state and the public. This situation could also entail confrontations between the arms of the state and parts of Jewish civil society, against the background of the tension between nationalism and democracy, preserving security and concern for universal values in the spheres of human and minority rights. In this situation one could expect incremental improvements in the situation of the Arab minority in the wake of judicial intervention, activities of NGOs, and external pressures. On the other hand, the Knesset and the government would act to increase supervision and the imposition of restrictions on representatives of the Arab community. In such a situation the Israeli Arabs would lose hope in the institutions of the state and bring claims before international courts and representatives of various countries. International criticism of Israel would increase. World Jewry would be divided between supporters of Israel and those who condemn it.

Would an agreement with the PA change the situation and lead to an improvement in democracy? Not necessarily. After an agreement was signed, most of the Jewish community would feel that they had done their part toward the Arab community in Israel, and from now on that community could fulfill its national aspirations in the framework of the Palestinian state that had been established. Any effort to change the character of the State of Israel in the direction of a bi-national state or a state of all its citizens would be interpreted as a violation of the agreement regarding the existence of two states for two peoples. Insistence that this was just an understanding limited to states and not to people would arouse great hostility on the part of the Jewish community.

Against this background there would be increased opposition to progress toward equality between Jews and Arabs in Israel, toward recognition of the Arabs as a national minority, and toward the granting of collective rights beyond individual rights. Nationalist circles in the state and in Jewish society would ride this wave. They would ignore the plight of the Arab community and support neo-liberal economic policies with no compensation in the area of welfare. Criticism would come from the Arabs in Israel and from moderate circles with a social-welfare orientation within the Jewish community aware of the distress of the Arab public. Civil society organizations in which both Arabs and Jews participate as well as Arab organizations would appeal to the courts against continued discrimination and the inequality of the Arab sector.

In the Arab community, solidarity would increase between those with a strong nationalist orientation and those with a moderate orientation, and it could even happen that some of the moderates would lose all hope of attaining improvements through negotiations. The result would be that, in fact, after the signing of agreement between Israel and the PA, the struggles between the elites of the two communities within Israel would grow in intensity. It would also cause a deep rift in the Israeli Jewish community. In such a situation, it is difficult to imagine there would be progress toward democratization in the short run, and ethnic democracy would remain in its present form.

The Improvement of Democracy: Improved Ethnic Democracy⁶³

This situation could occur because of the rise in power of moderate nationalists on both sides who strive for a considerable degree of symmetry between the two groups. There would be gradual progress from the existing situation to a

⁶³ The model of improved ethnic democracy was developed by Sami Smooha, 2001.

better one, with the main emphasis being on improvement of the civil status of the Arabs who live in Israel. The emphasis on improvement would focus on practical matters such as increasing the access of Israeli Arabs to the labor market, investment in education that would enhance the human capital of Arab settlements, investments in the local authorities and infrastructure in Arab areas, leading to improvement in the quality of life and, finally, creation of joint Jewish and Arab teams seeking to develop democracy in Israel.

In this situation the geopolitical conflict continues, but the dominant discourse is among moderate groups in both national camps (see Figure 1). In the discourse among these moderates, neither group would give up its national affiliations, but there would be practical recognition that under the existing conditions of the prolonged geopolitical conflict, it would be impossible to attain symmetry. The best that can be aspired to would be practical and concrete improvement in the situation, management of the conflict, mutual respect for desires, and the postponement of dreams for later stages, with doubt as to the possibility of completely fulfilling them. This discourse would take place in arenas hidden from view, mainly in the framework of civil society between Jewish and Arab social groups. Although the discourse would relate heavily to national identity, it would mainly be concentrated on expanding citizenship, and it would be pragmatic in character. The political result of such a situation would be improved ethnic democracy. This scenario could be a kind of preparation for the reconciliation scenario.

In this scenario, pressure would be exerted by social groups, business people, and the media to bring about reforms in the existing situation. The Israeli authorities would respond to this pressure, among other reasons out of understanding that the exterior conflict cannot be resolved, but its sting must be blunted and its influence on the Arab community reduced by means of partial response to internal demands. Consequently, action to develop the Arab sector would begin by investment in employment, housing, and infrastructure. At the same time, the autonomy of religious institutions would be strengthened, and the Arabs in Israel would enjoy autonomy in the area of education and culture. Nevertheless, the character of the state would remain Jewish-Zionist. These processes would lead to economic growth in the Arab sector and lessen the inequality between Jews and Arabs. As a result, the Arabs in Israel would be divided. On the one hand, some of them would emphasize the civic rapprochement and argue that they should work together with the state in order to improve the existing situation and improve the quality of life for the individual. Against them would be others who would

challenge the Jewish nation-state. They would emphasize the national motif and oppose those who emphasize the civic motif, arguing that cooperation with the state in an effort to improve the quality of life would be a betrayal of the national cause. The controversy between the Arab camps would concern the question which is of the highest value, the national or the civic? The power relations between the two groups would largely determine the direction of the scenario: continuation of liminality or a turn toward confrontation.

If the camp advocating the national value were to overcome the camp in favor of the civic value, the struggle between the Jews and the Arabs would probably become sharper and deeper, especially if the State of Israel remained embroiled in a national struggle against the PA. In this situation it would be difficult to enlist support for the Arab community from institutions of the state, including the courts. This might result in ignoring national claims while strengthening those within the Arab community who make civic demands. In that situation it would be possible to co-opt the latter by making a slight improvement in the existing ethnic democracy. It is difficult to imagine willingness on the part of Israelis to make more than slight changes if nationalism increases markedly among the Arabs in Israel. It is also possible that a deep controversy would develop within the Arab community, leading some of its members to integrate and others to resist. If the moderate camp prevails, it is possible to conceive of more significant progress in the area of democracy, including expansion of municipal boundaries, increasing budget allocations for Arab local authorities, and recognition of autonomy in the areas of education, religion, and culture.

In the situation of liminality, improvement of democracy would be an intermediate stage on the way toward reconciliation, though it could also be a temporary situation from which there would be retreat toward stagnation or even confrontation.

THE SCENARIO OF RECONCILIATION

Underlying this scenario are the processes mentioned in the liminal scenario, the main one being improvement of democracy. However, in the reconciliation scenario the deconstruction of primary ethno-national categories – Jewish and Arab – would be deepened, and sub-groups would develop whose interrelations would be different. This scenario cannot be made possible without geopolitical changes, including reaching an agreement between Israel and the PA. However, as has already been emphasized in the scenario of ethnic democracy, achievement of agreement is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reconciliation. In addition to geopolitical changes, psychological, cultural, and social changes must take place, to give the geopolitical changes democratic meaning. The mechanism that drives these changes is that of democratization, pursued by organs of civil society acting in the twilight zone of the frontier of democracy.⁶⁴

The Mechanism

The frontier of democracy is the space between nationalism and citizenship. This space is utterly opposed to the way of thinking prevalent on both sides, the essence of which is nationalist. Nationalist thinking is often notable for preoccupation with the question of the boundary of the national paradigm. Thus, for example, the question asked by representatives of the Jewish majority is: What is the boundary of the Zionist paradigm?⁶⁵ That is to say, what concessions and discounts can be made in the framework of the Zionist paradigm without losing its main principles? A similar question could be raised on the Arab-Palestinian side. These questions are important and critical, but they leave democracy in a marginal position: something left over after the national question is resolved. In contrast, the main question motivating the reconciliation scenario is: how can democracy be advanced without infringement by the national boundaries? This question deals with strengthening the frontier, the twilight zone, between the border lines of nationalism that are drawn by both sides.

The reconciliation scenario draws its power from the liminal situation, but it goes far beyond it, seeking significant psychological and social changes on both sides. These changes are connected with the action of vanguards within the Jewish and Arab community, who even today interpret reality differently

⁶⁴ For extensive development of the concept of the frontier of democracy, see Hasson, 2007.

⁶⁵ The option of the border of the Zionist paradigm was formulated by the jurist Ilan Saban, 1999.

from the way it is commonly interpreted by most of the public on both sides. This vanguard includes Arab and Jewish entrepreneurs who work toward creating joint enterprises, members of the third sector who seek out new solutions to the problems at the root of the conflict, people from the media who seek new ways to shape public opinion and to influence political labeling, and politicians who wish to break down the existing patterns, among other things, by means of injecting resources into the local Arab authorities and advancing affirmative action. This activity can create a new psychological and cultural field of cross-border cooperation. In this field an effort is made to read and write historical texts together, to get to the root of the fears and hopes of the other side, to develop joint scenarios, and to crystallize a shared vision for the Jews and Arabs of Israel. These activities are usually pursued outside of the political system and the establishment. It is civil society organizations that take part in them, young people who challenge prejudices, dreamers, and social leaders who are influenced by the changes that are taking place in the Middle East and the global system. These activities have no clear outline, but they are all intended to create a new space between the nationalist boundaries. Success in developing the new space could initiate a new era in relations between Jews and Arabs, where both sides could develop hybrid identities and common conceptions.

In the reconciliation scenario, the main impetus comes from civil society and not from political parties. In that respect, the vanguard in the area of thought and action passes from the legislature to social groups and their leaders. This transition is a sign of the deep crisis being experienced by Israeli parliamentary democracy. According to this scenario, the social organizations would challenge the populism that is widespread among elected representatives of the public. They would protest and work against the nationalist extremism exploited by Knesset members, Jews and Arab alike, and government ministers. In their actions they would often be assisted by the courts, which would become a central player in Israeli democracy. As a result, the struggle between the legislative and judiciary branches would intensify, and politics itself would begin to be divided between extremists and pragmatists. In the developing struggle, the first steps would be taken to change the situation by making resources available for development of the Arab sector, the removal of barriers in different spheres, employment of Arabs in the civil service, cessation of house demolition, solution of the problems of the Bedouins, and increasing allocation of resources to Arab local councils. These actions would be reported favorably in the media, which would become more attentive to the rift and the struggle taking places and the new ways taken to

bridge the gaps. Similarly, steps would be taken to extend the collective rights of the Arab public not only in the negative sense – not interfering with freedom, but in the positive sense – giving support for activities of collective nature in the spheres of religion, education, and culture.

The changes mentioned would not be received dispassionately by the opposing forces on both sides. Pressure would be exerted on those acting to strengthen citizenship and promote equality to come back home and adopt a nationalist position. The participants in the activities taken in the frontier of democracy would be condemned as traitors to the national cause. Accordingly, an intense campaign would be waged against those cooperating in the development of the frontier of democracy: “Self-hating Jews,” on the Jewish side, and “collaborators” on the Arab side. However, in the reconciliation scenario the hostile nationalist response would be trying to lock the stable after the horses were stolen. The world press would report extensively on events in Israel and on the notable rapprochement between Jews and Arabs. In international organizations, contributions would be raised and the two sides would be invited to present their views. Human rights organizations would publicize the progress being made in the frontier of democracy, and they would support the reconciliation process taking place in Israel.

The results would be hybrid public spaces in the areas of culture, society, housing, and social activity. The dominant phenomena would be placing processes that were hitherto under national dominance in the civic sphere: urban planning, economic thinking, what used to be called national service, regional development in the form of joint industrial projects, etc.. There would be basic understanding that national identity has an honorable place in the history and culture of both peoples. At the same time, along with honoring and recognizing the different national cultures and affiliations, there would be agreement that there is a place for joint activity of Jews and Arabs to advance a shared modern, and civic civilization within the framework of the state. This civilization would be defined by economic growth, technological development, the creation of shared employment spaces, social equality, improvement of education, preserving the environment, and advancing human welfare.

In this framework, democracy would be strengthened, a feature that distinguishes the reconciliation scenario from those of confrontation and liminality. In the confrontation scenario, nationalism grows stronger either through a bi-national state or a homogeneous nation-state. In the liminal scenario, stagnation would continue through the preservation of ethnic democracy. In the

reconciliation scenario, by contrast, democracy would be strengthened. This could happen during the transition to a democratic nation-state with minority rights or during movement, that would be fraught with danger, in the direction of a state of all its citizens or a state of all its nations. The transition to a bi-national state could receive expression in a consociational democracy or in any arrangement in which the emphasis would be on shared sovereignty. Among the three paths – a democratic nation-state with rights for the national minority, a state of all its citizens, or a state of all its nations – only the first path appears stable over time. If this path were to fail, one can expect a torn state in which the citizens, both Jews and Arabs, would be divided between loyalty to the state and loyalty to their national group.

Patterns of the Reconciliation Scenario

A Democratic Nation-state with Minority Rights

In this scenario, the state is characterized by an ideology that combines nationalism and democracy. It would be recognized as the state where the Jewish people fulfilled its right to self-determination just as the Palestinian state would enable the Palestinian people to fulfill its right to self-determination. At the same time, the state would be one where all the citizens, from the moment they are present in the country, have equal rights. In this situation, the Arab minority would be recognized as such with rights in the areas of religion, education and culture; there would be land reform and the unrecognized villages would be recognized; representatives of the Arab community would be integrated into the political and administrative systems, and they would take an active part in decision-making with respect to the allocation of resources. In this situation, the Arabs would also have the duties of citizenship. Among the Arabs, awareness would be strengthened that their future was tied to the State of Israel, and the peace process with Palestine would strengthen that tendency. Official planning in Israel would make Israeli society comparable to a cooperative apartment building where the apartments would be under private cultural ownership. Such an approach would make a significant contribution to consolidating this scenario. It would make certain to allocate land to the various population groups and see to egalitarian development and the creation of shared areas of encounter in the fields of employment, public services, open areas, and public transportation. In that way it would be possible to promote a shared civilization with a place for different cultures.⁶⁶ The State of

⁶⁶ These principles were a central component in the National Master Plan No. 35. See Hasson, 2005.

Israel would be the state of the Jewish people. The dominant language would be Hebrew. The Jews would be the majority. But the citizens of the country would enjoy fully equal rights on both the individual and the group levels.

A State of all its Citizens

According to this scenario, national identity would fade and civic identity would grow stronger. The expression of this would be the creation of an Israeli nation or the formation of a civil society in which there would be cultural and national variety, which would be a private matter for every citizen. In the civic state, religion and the state would be separate, and emphasis would be placed on the quality of life, equality, tolerance, and pluralism. The basis for affiliation would be a constitution that defines the rights of the residents. All the citizens would have equal status with respect to rights and duties. Many of the symbols that give preference to the Jewish public would be canceled, and the discrimination that exists today in the areas of allocation of land and resources to settlements, the development of infrastructure, and education, would be prohibited. The Law of Return would be changed. It would automatically grant asylum to persecuted Jews, but Jews who wished to immigrate or persecuted Jews who had sought asylum and wished to be naturalized would have to meet the criteria for the granting of citizenship. Similarly, citizenship would be given to non-Jews who met the criteria and who could make a contribution to the general welfare. Under such conditions, inequality would decrease significantly, constitutional patriotism would replace national patriotism, and liberal democracy would replace republican democracy.

This would effectively be the end of the Jewish-Zionist project. As a result of these processes, resentment would increase among the nationalist and religious Jews of Israel, among Diaspora Jews, and among Diaspora Palestinians. They would all feel betrayed. This resentment and division could lead to an inner rift, and the continued existence of the state as one of all its citizens would be determined by the civil strength of the new society. If the citizens of the state managed to develop a strong affiliation with it, based on civic patriotism, the state would survive. If they failed at that, an inner rift would develop, and the civic state would be divided into its national components.

Sub-Scenario: A Shared Civic State

In this sub-scenario, a strong civil society would be formed and emphasis would be placed on civil affiliation around shared focuses such as democracy, obedience

to the law, equality, and social justice, love of the land, and concern for the environment. Power would be shared, there would be proportional representation, and the minority would have the right of veto. Each group could lead its cultural life according to its values and tradition, but general issues of foreign policy and security, economic development, the budget, planning, development, and infrastructure would be managed jointly. The economic and social mobility of the Arabs in the state would be likely to blur national boundaries and lead to social connections between Jews and Arabs. Arab citizens who experienced social mobility would change their place of residence and move to Jewish cities and neighborhoods. Arab administrators would serve various communities of Jews and Arabs and make connections and affiliations that cross national boundaries. In the way a new civic identity would emerge and the feeling of being Israeli would grow stronger. The national identity would become more moderate and take the form of a communal identity.

Sub-Scenario: A Torn Civic State: Citizens Torn between their State and their Nation

This sub-scenario is the outcome of a civic state where civic equality does not restrain the national aspirations of the two sides. Both the Jewish and the Arab sides would experience a feeling of resentment at loss of national identity and at the reduced importance of religion and tradition. These feelings would be exploited by nationalist and religious circles, who would act to heat up the atmosphere. The poor relations between the State of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, which would criticize the idea of a civic state, would increase the dissatisfaction within the Jewish community. The resentment would be especially great among the Haredi, orthodox, and traditional Jews in Israel. The establishment of a democratic Palestinian state characterized by economic growth would be likely to strengthen the connection between the Arabs in Israel and their compatriots across the border. At the same time, criticism of the Palestinians in Israel would increase, as they would be accused of abandoning their compatriots, and in the Arab states and the Palestinian Diaspora they would be regarded as traitors. The effort to impose the obligations of citizenship on the Arabs in Israel, such as military service, would encounter great opposition. The resentment and criticism and ferment could be catalysts for agreed separation. In the scenario of agreed separation, the state would be divided, and the Arab community that chose to do so would join the Palestinian state. This arrangement could be accompanied by exchange of territory and even exchange of population.

CONCLUSION

The three scenarios presented in this paper describe movement between two main poles: that of *confrontation* and that of *reconciliation*. These are the poles that have defined thinking about relations between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel for close to a hundred years.⁶⁷ Early Zionist thought believed with great naivety that Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel would benefit the Arabs, improve their situation economically and socially, and that it would receive support from the Arab community.⁶⁸ The events of 1920, 1929, 1936-1939 made it clear how much such thinking was divorced from reality. The Arabs proved again and again that the matter of statehood was more important to them than any other. The result was a history of confrontation, which peaked with rejection of the United Nations Partition proposal in 1947 by the Arab League and the Arab leadership, the 1948 war which followed, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the disaster that struck the Arabs as a result of their decision. In the end, what determined and set the character of relations was power: military force and international support for Israel. Facing Arab hostility, Israel has adopted since the Arab rebellion of 1936-39 the confrontation scenario and the belief in power in response to the hopelessness of any possibility of peace and reconciliation.⁶⁹

The question to be asked is: what has happened since the establishment of the State of Israel? Has there been movement from the confrontation scenario to that of peace and reconciliation? Or has the confrontation scenario remained in force? Looking backward over the past sixty-four years, it appears that the State of Israel has chosen the middle path of the *liminal scenario*. This path is characterized by rhetoric that proclaims integration and equality but works according to the rules of opposition. The reasons for this have been the burdens of history, continuation of the geopolitical conflict, lack of mutual confidence between Jews and Arabs, and cultural and social estrangement. However, at the same time there has been a slow process of rapprochement that has found expression in the area of employment, partial and limited political integration, the provision of services,

⁶⁷ David Ben-Gurion's thinking vacillated between these poles. Between 1919 and 1936 he maintained (perhaps as a tactic) that it would be possible to reach an agreement. The events of 1936-1939 and especially the White Paper policy of 1939 led him to change his position and adopt the conflict approach, with the outcome to be determined by power. See Tevet, 1985.

⁶⁸ A prominent example of this way of thinking is found in Herzl's *Altneuland*, 1902.

⁶⁹ On the transition from a defensive conception to a conception based on the exercise of power in response to the events of 1936-1939, see Shapira, 1992.


cultural exposure, and acquisition of the Hebrew language by the second and third generations of the Arab public. In this way, opposing forces have operated in the political and cultural spheres, leading to the situation of *liminality* – which is an in-between stage, characterized by thin democracy – an ethnic democracy in which the Arab is seen as a threatening power.

A liminal situation, as shown here, is not static. It may be characterized by stagnation, vacillating between struggle and calm. It can deteriorate into confrontation or move toward reconciliation. Examination of the past thirty years shows this vacillation between struggle and calm. This is how one should read the events of 1976 and 2000. During times of struggle the power of those who emphasize national confrontation increases and brings out that which separates and is different. Conversely, during periods of calm, the power of those who emphasize the need for economic and social ties increases, emphasizing what is held in common. This vacillation expresses the tension between nationalism and citizenship; between geopolitics and globalization – the former motivated by local and regional conflicts (between Israel and the PA and between Israel and the Arab and Muslim worlds), and the latter motivated by economic ties. The meaning of this is that the liminal situation of relations between Jews and Arabs at the time of writing this article is likely to develop in various directions.

In light of this, the various scenarios presented here should be treated as way stations in a more prolonged development. In other words, there could be transitions between the various scenarios, the character of which will be determined by the ability of the two groups to combine nationalist tendencies with preservation of the principles of democracy. Will they succeed in doing this through negotiations, compromise, and the formulation of agreements, or will the path lead to crisis and confrontation? If there is crisis and confrontation, will the sides manage to reach an agreement after the confrontation and stabilize it, or are they doomed to a long period of instability and prolonged struggle?

In order to answer these questions, we must clarify, as suggested in Figure 2, the possible courses of movement between the scenarios over time. The vertical axis in Figure 2 describes the national orientation, which moves from low to high level. The horizontal axis describes the democratic orientation, and it moves from low to high level. The various scenarios treated in this paper and the possible paths of movement among them are mapped on these axes.

Figure 2: The possible paths of movement among the scenarios



It is possible to locate four possible paths over time:

1. **Prolonged Confrontation Ending in a Homogeneous Nation-State or a Bi-National State.** This path begins in movement from the present situation of ethnic democracy to an ethnocracy and from there to a bi-national state or a homogeneous Jewish nation-state. Deterioration of the present situation and continued control over the territories could bring Israel to the threshold of a bi-national state. In this situation, within the Jewish public the desire to retain the nature of the State of Israel as a Jewish state would increase. This process could be accompanied by transfer or voluntary exchange of population. Failure of transfer while the confrontation continued could lead to a bi-national state within Israel. Continued Israeli control over the West Bank could also lead to a bi-national state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. Both patterns of this path – the bi-national state and

the homogeneous nation-state – share the following characteristics: both are the result of confrontation, both are characterized by a high degree of nationalism and a high degree of democracy, and they both express the inability to maintain a Jewish nation-state where the Arab minority would enjoy a high level of rights.

2. **Gradual Improvement Culminating in a Jewish Nation-State with Minority Rights.** In this path, movement is from the present situation of ethnic democracy toward improved democracy, and afterward to a Jewish nation-state with minority rights for the Arab public. This path is characterized by preservation of the Jewish majority in the state, and by a gradual process of democratization that moves from the civil to the national field. During this process, agreements are formed between the majority and the minority regarding the character of the state. This path is based on a continued process of democratization, in which both sides find the middle way, balanced between nationalism and democracy. Thus, a stable structure is achieved without severe confrontations, though in its course many struggles are likely to be waged around forming the image of democracy in the state.
3. **A Radical Change in the Character of the State into a State of all its Citizens.** This path begins with a gradual change in the direction of improved ethnic democracy. In the next stage there would be movement toward a nation-state with minority rights, and later there would be movement toward a state of all its citizens. This path would be created if the Arab community obtained enough demographic and political power to change the character of the state, and if the two sides agreed to convert their national patriotism into constitutional patriotism, at the base of which would be a strong civic attachment to the constitution and the basic principles of the state. Even if the model of the civic state is achieved in this process, it can be expected that nationalist forces will always challenge it. One may therefore expect that this model will be unstable and that the national struggle will be renewed.
4. **Radical Change in the Character of the State: Transition to a State of all its Nationalities.** This path begins with a gradual change toward improved ethnic democracy, a nation-state with minority rights. However, there would be a transition to a state of all its nationalities (bi-national state). This path would be followed if the Arab community had the demographic and political power to change the character of the regime in the state from a

Jewish nation-state to a bi-national state. Most likely, the Jewish community that was prepared to advance toward improved democracy would oppose the transition to a state of all its nationalities. The Arabs in Israel would regard this transition as an expression of reconciliation and power sharing, whereas the Jewish community would see it as a double standard: a separate Palestinian state and another half state within Israel. Against this background a harsh confrontation would be likely to develop between the sides, particularly after it appeared that the stage of reconciliation and rapprochement had been reached. The results of this confrontation would be determined by the power of the sides. One possibility would be the formation of a homogeneous Jewish state; another would be the formation of a bi-national state characterized by a high degree of instability.

Several insights arise from this overview of the possible paths:

1. The various mechanisms presented in this paper are not separate from each another. It is certainly possible that a process could begin with reconciliation and deteriorate into confrontation.
2. The models of the state presented in this paper are not endpoints. They can be points along a continuum which moves from a high degree of nationalism and a low degree of democracy to other situations.
3. The bi-national state would be likely to result from a confrontation at an early stage or at a later stage after stagnation and reconciliation. In other words, the model of the bi-national state is not peculiar to a specific mechanism, and it is likely to reappear in various situations and at various times in the future.
4. The model of the nation-state in which the Jewish people fulfilled its right to self-determination but also maintained full democracy is one that is not implemented at present, and the movement discernible in relations between Jews and Arabs is in the opposite direction.
5. Movement toward the model of the democratic Jewish nation-state could take place if the two sides were able to reach agreement and compromise on essential matters in the civic and national area.
6. However, one must take into account that such compromises might lead to demands for establishment of a state of all its citizens or a state of all its

nationalities. Such demands could be accepted or rejected. In the case of rejection, one can actually expect renewal of the conflict after a long period of liminality and reconciliation.

7. Of all the paths, the most stable is the one leading to a Jewish nation-state with minority rights for the Arab community. The other paths are characterized by confrontation and instability. For these reasons, directing efforts to advance processes of democratization will in the long run make it possible to have a nation-state in which the Jewish people fulfill its right to self-determination and also to relate to democracy and the minority rights of the Arab community in an enlightened manner.

The question is: what path is the most likely in the short term and what could happen in the longer term? To answer this question, one must examine the basic condition of relations between Jews and Arabs and the expected trends. The basic situation is one of *liminality*. This is a situation in which the Arabs vote and are elected, but they still do not take part in decision making. This is a situation in which the Arab citizens of Israel have experienced social and economic mobility during the years of the state, but there is still a significant gap between them and the Jewish citizens. It is a condition in which there are ties between Jews and Arabs, but the barriers of suspicion overshadow these ties. This is a situation in which both groups contain sub-groups with different ideologies and values, who deconstruct the main categories of Jew and Arab.

Liminality is an unstable condition, and movement from it can be in various directions: toward confrontation, stagnation, or reconciliation. Since the 1980s there has been a trend to return to the history of *confrontation*. In the Arab community, the return to the confrontation scenario is led by intellectuals with religious and nationalist orientation, as well as some with secular nationalist orientation. The prominent movements in this area are the Northern Section of the Islamic Movement and the Balad Movement. However, the Communist Party, which was reincarnated in Hadash, could not be indifferent to these processes and it has adopted a clear and sharp nationalist line. The vision documents published in 2006 and 2007 express non-recognition of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. In parallel with that non-recognition, the State of Israel is called upon to recognize the Arabs in Israel as a national minority with collective rights in the spheres of religion, culture, and education. Likewise, the state is called upon to recognize the Arab-Palestinian catastrophe of 1948 and to

apologize officially and historically for the injustice and deprivation, and to make resources available for the immigration and naturalization of Arabs, including a right of return.⁷⁰ In this conception, there are Jewish citizens in Israel, not a Jewish people, and a native Arab national group.

It is highly unlikely that the Jewish public and its representatives in the Knesset would be prepared to make resources available to a group that challenges the basic premises of the State of Israel and yet call upon the state to treat the Arabs equally.⁷¹ Most of the Jewish community, as shown by the democracy index, regard the Arabs as a hostile element and are not willing to give that community rights, as is the practice in well-ordered democracies. Most of the Jewish community also objects to a bi-national state, as shown in a survey performed in early 2010. Most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza also reject that solution.⁷² Continued advocacy of this solution by Arab intellectuals who live in Israel, the identification of Israeli Arabs with the enemies of Israel, and the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict, lead to the conclusion that the confrontation scenario has a high probability of being realized. This scenario undermines the patterns that were created in the liminal situation and acts to create other patterns, including a nationalizing state with an ethnocratic regime, and later a bi-national state or a homogeneous Jewish nation-state.

The confrontation scenario is not at all new. It is the dominant scenario in the long history of Jewish-Arab relations in the Land of Israel during the past century. However, the developments that can be expected according to the confrontation scenario will take place in a territorial and institutional framework unlike those in the past. The confrontation will take place within the State of Israel and within territory whose status is unclear: part of it lies within the borders of the state and part of it lies beyond them. The conquest of the West Bank and the restrictions imposed on the Arabs in Israel will make them blend into each other. Practices that

⁷⁰ A summary of the demands raised in the vision documents can be found in Yousef Jabareen, 2010.

⁷¹ At the time of the publication of the vision documents I had a conversation with Shauki Khatib, who was the head of the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, and I shared my view with him, that the social demands made in the vision documents would not find willing ears because of the nationalist narrative that enveloped them. About half a year after that meeting, he told me that I was right, and that of dozens of responses to the vision document by Jews, only a few supported it. He proposed formation of a joint group of Jews and Arabs to examine the possibility of a new, joint version of the vision. The group met once and ceased meeting. Further conferences were held under the auspices of the Followup-up Committee and Shatil, the New Israel Fund's empowerment and training center.

⁷² PSR - Survey Research Unit: Joint Palestinian - Israeli Press Release 20 March 2010.

arose in the territories are likely to pass into the state, including the demolition of houses, confrontation and challenge to the rule of law, and various restrictions imposed by the authorities on the Arab community. In this situation, the chance of large allocations of resources to advance civil equality will be blocked because of growing antagonism on the national level.

In the territories occupied by Israel there could be a crisis because of lack of progress in the political negotiations. What could exacerbate the confrontation scenario is the collapse of the PA and the spread of anarchy in the territories. In that situation, a de facto bi-national space is liable to come into being, leading both sides to the verge of a bi-national state. Alternatively, in view of the demographic threat, the confrontation could end with a homogeneous Jewish nation-state after an exchange of population or even transfer.

Can the scenario of deterioration into confrontation in the short term be halted? In my opinion, definitely. Progress in negotiations with the PA could moderate internal tensions. On the level of relations between Jews and Arabs within Israel, it is possible to locate and reduce the slippage toward confrontation. Indications of this are the desire on the part of the Jewish public and policymakers to deal with the barriers that restrict the mobility of the Arab population, and decisions that have been made regarding the allocation of resources to the Arab community in the area of housing, employment, and security. Government officials, acting professionally, are involved in these allocations, for the purpose of improving the situation, although often without deep understanding of the existing problems.⁷³

What is needed, in light of these trends, is the development of a political and economic long-term strategy regarding the relations between Jews and Arabs. In the short term, action should be taken to prevent further degeneration of these relations. At this stage, the leadership of both sides must avoid extremism, tone down fiery rhetoric, avoid proposing exclusionary and anti-egalitarian legislation, and take action to diminish social and economic gaps. Agreement with the PA, even an intermediate agreement, could contribute to halting the degeneration.

In the middle term, the positive aspects connected with the liminal stage should be strengthened. In this area, social organizations can play an important role by shared reading and writing of the history of the two sides revealing their fears and hopes, and acting from below to advance democratic values, thus creating a common vision. At the same time, policymakers must act to allocate

⁷³ The insights are based on personal involvement in advancing the approach of removing barriers in government offices, and on information passed on to me by Ron Gerlitz, co-executive director of Sikkuy, the association for advancement of civic equality in Israel.

resources for the purpose of narrowing the gaps between Jewish and Arab local councils, developing infrastructure and sources of employment, and investing in housing and education in the Arab sector.

Contrary to those who believe that the confrontation scenario is inevitable, in my opinion it is possible to avert it. Instead of confrontation, it is possible to strengthen the situation of liminality and, by so doing, to lay the foundation for rapprochement and reconciliation. Flexible thinking is needed for this, as well as the ability to adapt to complex and ambivalent situations. In the confrontation scenario, reality is seen in black and white terms, with emphasis on the national component. That scenario has an essentialist character. It sequesters itself, including everyone who belongs to the national group and rejecting everyone else. It does not have the ability to develop understanding of liminal situations, of ambivalence, or of complexity, which is so necessary for nurturing cooperation. Thus, instead of understanding and helping the state, it pushes the moderates, too, into the hands of the extremists.

Today in particular, more than ever, a realistic strategy must be adopted to make the most of the liminal situation, where the two groups still are. It is still not too late to repair the damage. The realistic strategy must concentrate on managing the conflict and on the component of citizenship, placing emphasis on mutual respect on the collective and personal level. In developing the component of citizenship, an open dialogue must be held to promote equal rights and political integration, understanding that rapprochement will be slow because of the significant barriers.

The recommendations formulated by the joint teams of Jews and Arabs in the framework of a seminar on strategic thinking initiated in 2011 by *The Marker*, the business newspaper belonging to *Haaretz*, are very relevant in this stage. The recommendations included: (1) advancement of the Arab local councils by making their budgets equal to those of Jewish local councils, by improving management skills, and by increasing the transparency and responsibility of the heads of the councils; (2) advancement of the employment of Arabs by affirmative action and the creation opportunities for employment by aiding young men and women in the sector to acquire education and qualifications appropriate to the modern labor market; (3) strengthening the Arab business sector, removing the barriers that prevent access to credit for Arab businesses, encouraging business cooperation between Jewish and Arab companies; (4) improving the Arab education system and making its achievements equal to those of the Jewish educational system; and (5) creation of a shared vision for the two sides: the vision of democracy,

cooperation, shared culture and language, and education for the equality of the other.⁷⁴

In the Long Term, pragmatic action must be taken to move toward a nation-state in which the Jewish people fulfill their right to self-determination, with minority rights for the Arab community. This path is the only one of the four paths examined that promises progress without confrontations and the creation of a stable model of a democratic nation-state. All the other paths, including the one leading to a homogeneous nation-state, a bi-national state, and a state of all its citizens, are characterized by confrontation and instability over time. The path of the democratic nation-state offers gradual and slow progress from a situation of ethnic democracy to improved ethnic democracy and, finally, to a nation-state in which the Jewish people fulfill their right to self-determination and the Arab minority is recognized as a minority with collective national rights in the spheres of religion, culture, and language. This process entails finding a solution to the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and settling the relations between Jews and Arabs within Israel. Recognition of the nation-state in which the Palestinians can fulfill their right to self-determination must be accompanied by recognition of the nation state in which the Jews can fulfill their right to self-determination according to international law. This recognition can be accompanied by arrangements that give autonomy to the Arabs within Israel in substantial areas such as religion, language, and culture, as is called for in international treaties, and the advancement of a shared Israeli culture based on shared history, values, and symbols.

⁷⁴ Arlosoroff, 31 Jan., 2011.

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